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"The Internet in its nature shocks real-space law. '

The movement ofhuman activity into cyberspace must inevitably affect
the law governing individual rights. Cyberspace creates new potentials for

good and evil, for creative expression and criminal exploitation. This
duality generates tension between our desire to encourage the freedom and
autonomy that have thus far been the defining characteristics of
cyberspace2 and our obligation to ensure that it is not used for unlawful
purposes. Courts, legislators, and society as a whole must decide how to
balance this need for effective law enforcement against our historical
respect for individual rights and liberties. This article considers how that
balance should be struck with regard to what is perhaps the most
amorphous of these rights - the constitutional guarantee of privacy?

* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law, Dayton, Ohio.
199(2001).
2. See, e.g., id.
at 264-68.
3. As Professor Gormly pointed out, there are many different definitions of "privacy":
1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTruR OF IDEAS
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I. INTRODUCTION

While the U.S. Constitution does not expressly grant a general right to
privacy,4 the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution as

granting individuals a right to privacy that is incrementally derived from
various constitutional guarantees.' The guarantees that are the most
relevant to this discussion are the First Amendment's protection of free
speech and freedom of assembly, 6 the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable searches, 7 and the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination. 8
These three amendments protect privacy in different ways. The First
Amendment protects the privacy of certain acts.9 The U.S. Supreme Court
held that when protecting free speech and freedom of assembly, the U.S.

First, many scholars... have viewed privacy as an expression of one's personality

or personhood, focusing upon the right of the individual to define his or her
essence as a human being. Second.... are those... who have marked privacy
within the boundaries of autonomy - the moral freedom of the individual to
engage inhis or her own thoughts, actions and decisions. Athird cluster... have
seen privacy ... in terms of citizens' ability to regulate information about
themselves, and thus control their relationships with other human beings....
Finally, a fourth cluster of scholars have taken a more noncommittal, mix-andmatch approach, breaking down privacy into two or three essential components,
such as Ruth Gavison's "secrecy, anonymity and solitude"....
Ken Gormly, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 1335, 1337-38 (1992) (footnotes
omitted). For the concept of privacy articulated in this article, see infra Section V.
4. See, e.g., Alan H. Bomser, Report: A Lawyer's Ramble Down the Information
Superhighway,64 FORDHAM L.REV. 697, 739 (1995). One author maintains that as of 1890, "there
existed no coherent notion of privacy at all inAmerican law." Gormly, supra note 3, at 1343. But
see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were
intended to incorporate English common law principles into protecting privacy).
5. See. e.g.. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also Bomser, supra
note 4, at 739.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.This section only considers free speech guarantees insofar as
they impact upon the right to privacy. Infra Section 11 examines free speech in an on-line world.
7. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment also prohibits unreasonable
"seizures," but because seizures implicate interests other than privacy, this aspect of the
Amendment is not addressed in the discussion that follows. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 748 (1983) (seizures threaten only the interest in possessing objects, not privacy).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. See U.S. CONST. amends. 1,IV & V.
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Constitution guarantees the right to speak anonymously and also the right
to preserve the confidentiality of one's associations.'0 The Fourth
Amendment historically has protected certain areas from unauthorized
governmental intrusions based on their constitutional classification as
"private."" The Fifth Amendment's contribution is more limited; while the
U.S. Supreme Court has said that the privilege against compelled selfincrimination protects "personal privacy,"' 2 it has "never on any ground,
10. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comn'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995):
[An author generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose his or her true
identity. The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by
a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation
may be,. . . the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as acondition
of entry. Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous.., is an aspect
of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
(footnotes omitted). See also NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958) ("This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy
in one's associations."). See generally Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with
Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 288, 307-08 (2001).
I1. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294,304 (1967) ("the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection ofprivacy").
See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment"). The "intrusion" need
not be a physical intrusion into a protected area. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2046
(2001) "(Where... the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant").
The extent to which the Fourth Amendment has evolved into a measure that protects more
than private "places" is analyzed in Section 111, infra.
12. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976). See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964):
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice;.., our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life."...
(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd
353 U.S. 391 (1957) (Frank, J.,
dissenting). See also United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322, 327
(1973) (privilege "respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought"); Griswold
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personal privacy included, applied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the
otherwise proper acquisition... of evidence which.., did not involve
compelled testimonial self-incrimination of some sort."' 3 Therefore, the
only role the Fifth Amendment plays in this skein of privacy is to prevent
the state from forcing people to divulge their guilty secrets.
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren recognized in 1890 that the essence
of constitutional privacy guarantees, all of which were crafted to deal with
conduct occurring in the physical world, established a right to be let
alone, 4 a right to be ignored absent some demonstrable basis for official
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (privilege "enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy").
13. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399 (footnote omitted). See also id at 401:
The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the Fourth
Amendment.... They did not seek in still another Amendment the Fifth to
achieve a general protection of privacy but to deal with the more specific issue of
compelled self-incrimination.
But see William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins ofCriminal Procedure, 105 YALEL.J. 393,41819 (1995) (early privilege against self-incrimination concerned itself with protecting private
information).
14. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
193 (1890) (defining privacy as "the right to be let alone"). Although the Warren-Brandeis article
argued that violations of privacy should be cognizable in tort, the right to privacy they articulated
had a constitutional foundation. See, e.g., Gormly, supra note 3, at 1357:
Many commentators have attempted to sever the "expectation of privacy"
which has evolved in American jurisprudence under the Fourth
Amendment, from the tort of privacy created by Warren and Brandeis in
1890 ....Such a sharp division is unfortunate, however, because history
confirms that the various offshoots of privacy are deeply intertwined at the
roots, owing their origins to the same soil. In the case of the Fourth
Amendment, the same soil was Louis Brandeis, who laid the groundwork
for the constitutionalization of his notion of privacy in Olmsteadv. United
States.
(footnotes omitted). See also id. at 1360 (noting that in his Olmstead dissent, Brandeis "borrowed
heavily from his Harvard piece... weaving the 'right to be let alone' into a Fourth Amendment
concept of privacy relating to searches and seizures"). For a discussion of Justice Brandeis' dissent
in Olmstead v. United States, see infra text accompanying note 37.
Professor Lawrence Lessig divides privacy into three different concepts: privacy as a way to
minimize the burden of state intrusions; privacy as dignity; and privacy as substantive. See
LAWRENCE LEssIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 146-49 (1999). The first concept

recognizes that the state has the right to interfere with our desire to be left alone but seeks to ensure
that such interferences are kept to a minimum. See id. at 146 ("The test then is the burden of the
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scrutiny, and the fulfillment of certain procedural requirements necessary
for the implementation of such scrutiny. 5 This right to be let alone was
"designed to balance the people's interests in privacy against the legitimate
need for the
government" 6 to collect information pertaining to criminal
7
activity.1
state's intervention; when an intervention can be made less burdensome, the protection against it
decreases as well"). The second concept postulates "that the very idea of a search of your
possessions is an offense to your dignity. From this perspective, if the state wants to search your
house, it had better have a good reason." Id.at 147. The third concept regards privacy "as a
at 149. "As a restriction on the power of government
substantive limit on government's power." Id.
to enforce certain laws, it provides a substantive limit on the kinds of regulation that government
can effectively impose." Id
15. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law ofCriminalProcedure,93
MIcH. L. REv. 1016, 1029 (1995):

Law enforcement, civil or criminal, depends on information. That information
is often "private" in the sense that it rests in the hands of someone who would like
it kept secret. This description fits almost all incriminating evidence in the hands
of a criminal defendant, information that sometimes cannot be extracted due to the
Fifth Amendment. Much of the information the system needs is also "private" in
a more meaningful sense. It is of a type that many people, not just a particular
litigant, might care about keeping secret....
Fourth Amendment law purports to protect most information that is private in
this second sense. Unless the police have a facially valid warrant or sufficient
cause together with a valid exception to the warrant requirement, they may not
search for evidence in places that are both (i) hidden from public view and (ii)
likely to contain the sorts of things that ordinary people wish to keep to
themselves.
The right to be ignored only applies to official, state action. The ability to escape private
scrutiny has always depended on taking affirmative action to avoid such scrutiny. See,
e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The makers of our
Constitution... conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone -the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men").
16. Stuntz, supra note 15.
17. LESSIG, supranote 14, at 113. See also Anjali Singhal, The PiracyofPrivacy?A Fourth
Amendment Analysis ofKey Escrow Cryptography,7 STAN; L. & PoL'Y REV. 189, 198 (1996)
("The Fourth and Fifth Amendments balance the individual's right to privacy against the
government's responsibility to enforce this country's laws"). See. e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the Fourth and Fifth Amendments incorporated English common law
principles that focus on protecting the individual from "the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property"). See also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473
(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting):
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, ...[fiorce and violence
were then the only means known to man by which a government could directly
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The right to be left alone emerged as a reaction to activities conducted
in the real world and manifested itself as a constraint on law enforcement's
ability to effect real world intrusions.' Such intrusions not only included
entering into and searching physical spaces, but also detaining, searching,
and questioning individuals. 9 The first significant challenge to these
concepts and constraints came with the appearance of technology, 0
effect self-incrimination. It could compel the individual to testify - a compulsion
effected, if need be, by torture. It could secure possession of his papers and other
articles incident to his private life - a seizure effected, if need be, by breaking

and entry. Protection against such invasion of "the sanctities of a man's home and
the privacies of life" was provided in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by
specific language.
See generally Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,376 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (First, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments are "closely related, safeguarding... 'conscience and human dignity and
freedom of expression'); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-44 (1897) (noting the "intimate
relationship" between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, both of which attempt to perpetuate
"principles of humanity and civil liberty").
18. See, e.g., Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-30 (reviewing English common law, "every American
statesman, during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar"
- barring government invasions of privacy and noting that these principles, which found
expression in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
The "real world" is our shared physical reality that provided the corporeal venue for the
historical development of the criminal law and criminal procedure principles we apply today. See,
e.g., Brenner, infra note 121, 1310. See also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g.. LEsslo, note 14, 112-14. Lessig explains that the Fourth Amendment was
written at a time when "the legal protection against the invasion of privacy was trespass law," and
its warrant requirement aimed to protect officers from civil suits for trespass. See id. at 112-13. See
also id at 113-14:
The Fourth Amendment focuses on trespass because that was the primary mode
of searching at the time. If it had been possible simply to view the contents of a
house without going inside, the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment would have
made little sense. But the protections of the amendment did make sense as a way
to draw the balance between the government's power to search and the people's
right to privacy given the regime of trespass law and privacy-invading
technologies that prevailed at the end of the eighteenth century.
(emphasis in the original).
20. Indeed, it was technology that produced an awareness of and a concern with the notion
of "privacy." See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14, at 193:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must
be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what
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namely, the telephone, which permitted instantaneous synchronous remote
communication between individuals.2 The proliferation of telephone
technology in the early Twentieth Century compelled courts to consider
how, if at all, traditional guarantees of privacy should be applied to
mediated communication.2
Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone." Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that
"what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."
...The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury....
See also Gormly, supra note 3, at 1336 (Brandeis & Warren argued for the recognition of a "new
right," the right of privacy).
21. For the distinction between synchronous and asynchronous communication, see. e.g., R.J.
Slagter, Visual Attention in Multiparty Communication 6 (University of Twente, 1997), available
at https://doc.telin.nl/dscgi/ds.py/Get/File (last visited Oct. 6, 2002):
A face-to-face meeting is an example of synchronous communication.
Synchronous communication is characterized by the fact that the cues sent by one
person are instantly received by the other. If cues are first stored in some way, and
the other person receives them later, the communication is asynchronous.
Examples of asynchronous communication are: a letter, a voice mail and an e-mail
message.
See also Karrie Karahalios, Communication Systems: A Comparison Along a Set of Major Axes,
available at http://www.media.mit.edu/ -kkarahal/generals/communication/ (last visited Aug. 23,
2002). See generally William J. Mitchell, The City ofBits Hypothesis in HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND
Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES (D. Sch~n et al. eds., 1996) (synchronous communication can take
place in face-to-face interactions or via the telephone; asynchronous communication can take the
form, either, of a letter, a voice mail message or an e-mail message); Mary E. Virnoche, When A
Stranger Calls: Strange Making Technologies and the Transformation of the Stranger (1999),
available at http://www.humboldt.edu/-mv23/STRANGER.PDF (last visited Dec. 18, 2002)
(analyzing mediated and non-mediated communication strategies).
22. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 14, at I l l (noting that by the 1920s telephones "had become
a dominant mode of communication" and life had "begun to move onto the wires"). See also
CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940, 33-53
(1992).
The telephone was not the first technology to achieve instantaneous interchanges by
applying "the natural phenomenon we call electricity to the processes of human communication."
BRIAN WILSON, MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY - A HISTORY: FROM THE TELEGRAPH TO THE

INTERNET 321-36 (1998). That honor belongs to the telegraph, which permits asynchronous
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communication between people located at some geographical remote. See, e.g., TOM STANDAGE,
THE VICTORIAN INTERNET vii (1998) ("During Queen Victoria's reign, a new communications
technology was developed that allowed people to communicate almost instantly across great
distances"). After Samuel Morse formed his telegraph company in 1845, the "growth of the
telegraph network was... nothing short of explosive." See id. at 56-91. As lines were installed
around the world, the telegraph "revolutionized business practice, gave rise to new forms of crime,
and inundated its users with information." Id. at vii.
But for practical reasons, telegraphy did not give rise to the privacy challenges associated with
telephonic technology. It was a proprietary communication system in which all communications
were necessarily revealed to agents of the telegraph company, who translated the messages into
Morse Code and transmitted them to another agent, who then translated them from Morse Code and
delivered them to the recipient. See, e.g., id. at 63-65. See also Arthur W. Grumbine, The Era of
Morse Telegraphy:Part1,availableat http://www.faradic.net/-gsraven/telegraphtales/grumbine
was no different from opening
grumbinel.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002) ("Telegraphy ....
everybody's mail and reading every word of it; then sending the contents across country by a
peculiar code system invented by Samuel F.B. Morse"). It was simply not possible for those who
employed telegraphic communication to claim that the privacy of their communications had been
compromised by "outsiders." There were, in effect, no nonconsensual "overhears" in the
telegraphic system. See generallyKarahalios, supra note 21 (privacy was less of a concern with the
telegraph because it "did not prevail in the home environment" and therefore tended to involve
messages of a less personal nature). But see id. at 110-12 (telegraph patrons' concern about having
their privacy compromised by the clerks who sent the messages gave rise to the widespread practice
of sending telegrams in private code). See, e.g., Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1894) (suit seeking damages for mistake made in transmitting coded telegraphic message; Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Louisville Cotton Oil Co., S.W. 843, 852-53 (Ky. App. Rptr. 1909) (suit
for damages resulting from failure to deliver coded telegraphic message). Coded telegrams were
sometimes used in criminal activity. See, e.g., State v. Chapman, 6 Nev. 320, 1871 WL 3337, at
*5 (Nev. 1871) (accomplice sent a "cipher telegram" advising robbers when a large shipment of
coins would be arriving).
There were concerns that private messages might - by error or by intent - be delivered to
the wrong parties or the contents otherwise revealed improperly. These concerns prompted some
states to adopt statutes creating a cause of action for those whose messages went awry or were
made public. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2900 (Michie 1900)
(telegraph companies shall be liable for special damages occasioned in ...
delivering dispatches or for the disclosure of the contents of any private dispatch
to any person other than to him to whom it was addressed,... the amount of these
damages to be determined by the jury upon the facts in each case. Grief and
mental anguish occasioned to the plaintiff... may be considered by the jury in the
determination of the quantum of damages
(quoted in Connelly v. W. Union Telegraph Co., 40 S.E. 618,622 (Va. 1902)). See also IND. REV.
STAT. § 5513 (1894) (cited in W. Union Telegraph v. Bierhaus, 36 N.E. 161, 162 (Ind. App. 1894)).
Some states made it a crime for a telegraph company or its employees to disclose the contents of
a telegram to anyone but the authorized recipient. See, e.g., MINN. GEN. STAT. § 6782 (1894) (cited
in Peterson v. W. Union Telegraph Co., 77 N.W. 985,987 (Minn. 1899); 13 WAGNER'S STATUTES
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Mediated communication is communication that takes place via some
artificial medium (such as the telephone); it is distinguishable from direct,
or face-to-face, communication.23 Mediated communication can be
specifically directed at one or more known parties, as in a telephone
conversation, or it can be disseminated generally to an unidentified
audience, such as in radio or television broadcasts.24 Mediated
communication can also be interactive, like the telephone conversation, or
it can be the unilateral transmission of information, such as with radio or
television broadcasts.

§ 51 (cited in Exparte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 1880 WL 423, at *4 (Mo. 1880)). See also Little Rock
& Fort Smith Tel. Co. v. Davis, 41 Ark. 79, 1883 WL 1201, at* 3 (Ark. 1883) (noting state statutes
imposing civil liability and criminal penalties) (citing ScoTr & JARNAGAN, LAW OF TELEGRAPHS
§§ 419-46).
In the Nineteenth Century, telegrams were far more private than telephone conversations. See,
e.g., Brashears v. W. Union Telegraph Co., 45 Mo. App. 433, 1891 WL 153, at *4 (Mo. App. 1891)
("[Tihe use of telephonic connections in intra-urban service practically amounts to a collateral
disclosure of the contents of a private telegram"). See generally FISCHER, supra, at 7 1.
23. See, e.g., Prasad Boradkar, The Object(s) of Communication, Industrial Design Society
of America - 2001 Proceedings, available at http://www.idsa.org/whatsnew/Oled proced/
boradkar.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002):
The purest ... form of interpersonal communication is executed face to face
between two people without the use of any implement or instrument, and is called
unmediated communication .... [M]ediated communication involves the use of
a commodity/artifact/ technology, and is impure because the mere presence of a
medium interferes with the process.

Id.; see also Robert T. Craig, Communication in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC, available at
http://spot.colorado.edu-craigr/Communication.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) (one way of
classifying communication is according to the.., media... through which it
occurs .... Medium (in current usage often confused with its Latinate plural form,
media) refers to a particular configuration of physical, technological, and
institutional characteristics that constitute a distinct form of communication such
as face-to-face interaction, commercial television, or electronic mail).
24. An example of mediated communication directed at a "known" party is a telephone
conversation. Absent obscene or harassing calls, the parties to such a conversation "know" each
other in the sense that they each know the identity of the other, though they may not be personally
acquainted. Television broadcasts, newspapers, or web sites are clear examples of mediated
communications disseminated generally to an unidentified audience. In none of these examples
does the speaker "know" the identities of all the persons who will receive the communication.
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The first form of mediated communication was not telephonic, but
rather used written symbols to record communications on paper. Unlike

telephonic communication, which is necessarily interactive, written
communication can either be interactive, as in an exchange of business or
personal letters, or it can consist of unilaterally transmitting information,
as with the publication of newspapers or other periodicals. The
interactivity of telephonic communication and one-to-one written
communication makes these types of mediated communications analogous
to face-to-face communication. The analogy is more imperfect for written

communication because the parties not only lack the opportunity to
observe the body language of their correspondents,25 but they also conduct
a "conversation" that does not occur in real time.
Written one-on-one communication historically enjoyed the protections
of existing privacy guarantees, at least while the writing was in transit.26
25. In face-to-face communication, "[lianguage is closely linked with and supported by, nonverbal communication which adds to the meaning of utterances, provides feedback, controls
synchronisation and also plays a central role in human social behaviour." Katerina Mania & Alan
Chalmers, A Classificationfor UserEmbodiment in CollaborativeVirtualEnvironments, available

at http://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Tools/Reports/Ps/l 998-maniapdf (last visited Oct. 28,2002). See also
Janet Bavelas et al., Using Face-to-FaceDialogue as a Standard for Other Communication

Systems, 22 CANADIANJ. COMM. (1997). Non-verbal cues are communicated via facial expressions,
gaze, gestures, posture, "self-representation," and bodily contact. See Mania & Chalmers, supra.
The parties to telephonic communication do have some opportunity to assess nonverbal cues,
as they can analyze the tenor and other characteristics of the voice of each other. See, e.g., Bavelas
et al., supra (in telephone conversations "[tihere are.., audible non-verbal features, such as the
nuances of vocal inflection, tone of voice, and pauses - all of which can convey significant
information" to the listener).
26. See, e.g., Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878):
[A] distinction is to be made between... what is intended to be kept free
from inspection, such as letters, and sealed packages ... and what is open
to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, .

.

. and other printed

matter.... Letters and sealed packages... are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection... as if they were retained by the parties..
. in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the
people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever
they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined
under like warrant, .. . as is required when papers are subjected to search
in one's own household.
See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) ("Letters and other sealed packages
are . . . effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy"). As was
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Conceptually, the protection derived from the fact that the transmitting
correspondent took efforts to shield the content of the communication from
outsiders, e.g., by sealing the message into an opaque envelope.2 This was
not true of other categories of written communication, which were made
public or "published. ' 8
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the privacy of telephonic
communications in Olmsteadv. UnitedStates.29The issue in Olmsteadwas
"whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations . ..
intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the

explained earlier, the structure of telegraphic communication meant that it did not produce the type
of privacy issues associated with written and telephonic communication. See supra note 22.
27. See supra text accompanying note 26.
28. See id.
29. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Prior to Olmstead, only a few reported decisions addressed
wiretapping, mostly in the context of prosecutions under statutes that made it a crime to intercept
telegraph or telephone messages. See, e.g., State v. Behringer, 172 P. 660, (Ariz. 1918) (holding
it was not a violation of Arizona Penal Code section 692 - which made it unlawful "by means of
any machine, instrument or contrivance" to read or attempt to read "any message, or to learn the
contents thereof, whilst the same is being sent over any telegraph or telephone line" - to place a
dictograph over the transom of a room and thereby hear what was said over a telephone). See also
id. at 479 n. 13 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (listing statutes that made it a crime to intercept telephone
or telegraph messages).
Several of the reported cases indicate that wiretapping was far from uncommon, even before
Olmstead was decided. In State v. Nordskog, 136 P. 694 (Wash. 1913), the Washington Supreme
Court reversed the conviction of a former detective and "professional wire tapper" for "damaging"
a telephone line. The Washington Supreme Court based the conviction solely on his having tapped
the line to intercept a message. See id.at 694-95. The Washington Supreme Court found that the
mere act of tapping the line inflicted no damage, but it also noted the need for legislation to prevent
further such acts:
[T]here has been altogether too much of this form of pilfering going on in this
state, and the omission of the law now disclosed calls aloud for legislative action.
... [T]he law should be so framed that the privacy of all citizens... may be
protected, and that any tampering or interference, however slight, that is not done
under the rules of the company and by its agents, or under some regulation of the
public service commission, may be prohibited....
Id. at 695. See also Robilio v. United States, 291 F. 975, 982-83 (6th Cir. 1923) (upholding the
admissibility of evidence obtained by wiretapping the home of the defendant against evidentiary
challenges as to its authenticity; no challenge was based on the act of wiretapping itself); People
v. McDonald, 165 N.Y.S. 41,44-45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917) (refusing to suppress evidence obtained
by tapping the home of the defendant on the grounds that under New York law it was immaterial
how the state obtained the evidence and that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states, only
to the federal government).
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Fourth and Fifth Amendments."3 The U.S. Government installed wiretaps
on phone lines leading from the residences of Roy Olmstead, the suspected
leader of a large bootlegging operation, and several of his associates.' The
U.S. Government used the information so gathered to prosecute suspected
bootleggers for violating prohibition laws.32 The wiretaps connected to the
phone lines as they ran toward the residences; therefore, there was no

physical intrusion into the homes.33 In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Taft, a majority of the Court resolved the issue by simply transposing
traditional Fourth Amendment34 standards into this new context. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the intercepted conversations effected neither a
"4search" nor a "seizure" because there was no physical intrusion into a

30. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57.
31. See id. at 455-56:
The evidence ... discloses aconspiracy of amazing magnitude to import, possess,
and sell liquor unlawfully. It involved... not less than 50 persons, ... two sea-

going vessels for the transportation of liquor..., the maintenance of a central
office manned with operators, and the employment of executives, salesmen,
deliverymen dispatchers, scouts, bookkeepers, collectors, and an attorney....
Olmstead was the leading conspirator and the general manager of the business.
32. See id. at 455 ("The petitioners were convicted in the District Court for the Western
District of Washington of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act... by unlawfully
possessing, transporting and importing intoxicating liquors and... by selfing intoxicating liquors").
33. See id. at 456-57:
[I]nformation . . . was . . . obtained by intercepting messages on the

telephones of the conspirators.... Small wires were inserted along the...
telephone wires from the residences of. . . the petitioners and those
leading from the chief office. The insertions were made without trespass
upon any property of the defendants. They were made in the basement of
the large office building. The taps from house lines were made in the
streets near the houses.
34. The U.S. Supreme Court found there was no basis for applying the Fifth Amendment
because there
was no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their many
telephones. They were continually and voluntarily transacting business without
knowledge of the interception. Our consideration must be confined to the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 462.
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constitutionally protected area." Justice Brandeis dissented, arguing that
"in the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be." 36 Justice Brandeis maintained that in
order to preserve the values the U.S. Constitution intended to protect, what
37
is now known as a "technological-neutral" interpretation was necessary.
It was not until 1967, in Katz v. United States," that the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that the literal transposition of standards, developed to
deal with the intrusions encountered in centuries past, was not a viable way

by which to preserve and enforce privacy guarantees in an age of electronic
communication. The issue was whether the government had violated
Katz's Fourth Amendment rights by using a wiretapping device installed
on the outside of a phone booth to record calls he made while inside.39 The

35. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466:
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that
the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them are not within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment....
We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished the interception ofsealed mail. See id. at 465 ("the unlawful
rifling by a government agent of a sealed letter is a search and seizure of the sender's papers of
effects").
36. Id. at 474.
37. See id. at 473-74:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted... [fiorce and violence
were then the only means known to man by which a government could directly
effect self-incrimination. It could compel the individual to testify... by torture.
It could secure possession of his papers and other articles incident to his private
life... by breaking and entry.... But "time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading
privacy have become available to the government....
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which
the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and . . . expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home ....

Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such

invasions of individual security?
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. Id. at 348.
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Katz Court rejected Olmsteadinfavor of the approach Justice Brandeis had
advocated forty-years before:
[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will
not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more

narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication.4"
Almost forty years after Olmstead, Katz broadened constitutional
interpretation sufficiently to bring telephonic communication -

Nineteenth Century technology - within the ambit of the privacy
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.4 ' However, as the U.S. Supreme

40. Id. at 352. The shift in perspective was no doubt attributable to the increased use and
sophistication of surveillance technology:
By the 1950s, the technology that enabled government surveillance had grown by
exponential leaps. Parabolic microphones, transmitters the size of cigarette packs
... and miniature television transmitters made it possible... to watch, listen and
record virtually any sound or movement.... Attempts by the states to... prohibit
wiretapping were largely ineffective. The state statutes tended to create broad
exceptions for police conducting eavesdropping ... [and] the language of the
statutes was rarely drafted to keep up with the swiftly-changing technology,
rendering them quickly obsolete....
The 1960s soon witnessed a national uproar over the unchecked ability of
government ... to eavesdrop. Attorney General Robert Kennedy appeared before
the Senate Judiciary Committee... in support of new legislation which would...
authorize government interceptions only with court orders....
In his State of the Union address in 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson...
delivered the following message, amidst bipartisan applause:
We should protect what Justice Brandeis called the "right most valued by
civilized men" - the right to privacy. We should outlaw all wiretapping...
except when the security of the nation is at stake - and only then with the
strictest governmental safeguards. And we should exercise the full reach of our
Constitutional powers to outlaw electronic "bugging" and "snooping."
Gormly, supra note 3, at 1363-64.
41. Alexander Graham Bell patented the telephone in 1876, so it was more than fifty years
old when Olmstead was decided. See. e.g., WILSON, supra note 22, at 43-48. See also The History
of the Telephone, available at http://inventors.about.comlibrary/inventors/bltelephonehtm (last
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Court decided Katz, efforts were underway that would result in the
invention of the Internet, and with it new and infinitely more complex

Varieties of mediated communication.42 By the time the Twenty-First
Century dawned, cyberspace had become an important new venue for
mankind's activities, licit and illicit. The rise and proliferation of
cybercrime raised new problems for law enforcement, both with the
enforcement of existing substantive laws against conduct vectored through
cyberspace and also in the gathering of evidence without violating the
existing privacy standards.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT

The use of cyberspace offers criminals a number of advantages, despite
the existing substantive laws. The most pertinent of those advantages to
this discussion is anonymity.43 A March 2000, report issued by the
visited Aug. 29, 2002); The Bell Patent, available athttp//inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bl
telephonel.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
42. See. e.g., WILSON, supra note 22, at 321-36. See also Hobbes' Internet Timeline v5.4,
available at http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/(last visited Aug. 29,2002); Christopher
D. Hunter, The Real History ofthe Internet in THE USES AND GRATIFICATIONS OF PROJECr AGORA,
available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/chunter/agora-uses/chapter-2.html (last visited Aug.
29, 2002).
43. A distinction is often drawn between "anonymity" and "pseudonymity." Both involve
shielding the true identity of oneself: pseudonymity is the use of a false name, an alias, to disguise
the identity of oneself; anonymity consists of concealing the identity of oneself. See. e.g., David
G.Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, andLimited Liability
in Cyberspace, I I U.CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149-51 (1996):
An "anonymous message" can be defined as a message that provides the recipient
with no information.. concerning the identity of the message originator....
...Assume... you receive a series of [untraceably anonymous] e-mails, all
bearing the same signature .... As you come to associate certain characteristics
with the ... entity associated with the identifier "your friend" - grammar,

spelling, style... and so on - it becomes increasingly useful to recognize that
"your friend," whoever or whatever it may be, is the message originator. "Your
friend," in short, has become a pseudonym.
See also id. at 152 (a "pseudonymous message" is "anonymous (in the sense that it provides no
information concerning the identity of the... individual.., responsible for.. . transmitting the
message), but.. .contains some information about the identity of some cognizable entity that is"
its originator).
The discussion which follows in the text uses the term "anonymity" to encompass both
practices because it is concerned with the extent to which the First Amendment protects the right
to shield the true identity of oneself regardless of the technique used to do so. See, e.g., McIntyre
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President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet noted
many of the problems on-line anonymity poses for law enforcement:
Anonymous e-mail accounts, which are e-mail accounts where
subscriber information is not requested or verified, are the
proverbial double-edged sword. Such accounts can protect privacy,
but they add new complexities to identifying online lawbreakers,
such as individuals who send child pornography, death threats,
computer viruses, or copyright-protected works by e-mail.
Similarly, "anonymous re-mailer" services, which are e-mail
services that strip the source address information from e-mail
messages before passing them along to their intended recipients,

raise difficult privacy and law enforcement policy issues. On the
one hand, anonymous re-mailer services provide privacy and
encourage freedom of expression.... On the other hand, such
services can plainly frustrate legitimate law enforcement efforts."

The unique nature of cyberspace's mediated communication only
exacerbates the problems anonymity poses, especially with regard to
certain types of criminal activity:

v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995) (describing Madison, Hamilton and
Adam's use of the pseudonym "Publius" in publishing the Federalist Papers as part of"a respected
tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes").
44. WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET §
Il1(B)(2) (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov./criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm (last
visited Dec. 9, 2002). See Testimony of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder Before the
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice Oversight ofthe Senate Judiciary Committee (February 29, 2000), available at http://www.
cdt.org/security/000229justice.shtml (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Holder Testimony]:
It doesn't take a master hacker to disappear on a network.... [A] criminal using
tools and other information easily available over the Internet can operate in almost
perfect anonymity. By weaving his or her communications through a series of
anonymous remailers; by creating a few forged e-mail headers with powerful,
point-and-click tools readily downloadable from mimy hacker web sites; or by
using a "free-trial" account or two, a hacker, online pornographer, or web based
fraud artist can often effectively hide the trail of his or her communications.
See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1037 (2001);
Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and International Law Enforcement in Cyberspace 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231 (1996).
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Although prior communication methods permit anonymous
communications, those services generally provide one-to-one
communications. It would be both time-consuming and costly to use
either the phone or mail systems to disseminate information
wholesale, effectively preventing wide-scale malicious use and
limiting the harm that can be caused. On the Internet, by contrast,
there are no monetary or technical impediments to worldwide
dissemination of communications.45
Anonymity, however, is part of the right to be let alone. As noted
earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court has held, in decisions addressing conduct
based in the real world, that the First Amendment guarantees the right to
speak anonymously and to preserve the confidentiality of one's
associations.4" No one disputes that anonymity plays a legitimate role in
on-line discourse.47 The issue is how to translate rights devised to deal with
45. Hearings on "Mayhem Manuals andthe Internet"before the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Technology and Government Information ofthe Senate Judiciary Committee. available at 1995 WL
293484 (Testimony of Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Criminal Division).
46. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42; NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958). In the discussion that follows, "anonymity" is used to encompass both the
right to speak anonymously and the right to "associational privacy." The application of the two
rights is clearly distinct in the real world because associations in the real world are face-to-face and
therefore not anonymous; even if the parties involved in such an association use false names, the
nature of face-to-face interaction means that they learn enough information to be able to identify
each other by physical appearance. In the context of the real world, therefore, authorities can order
someone to reveal the identities of those with whom they have associated, confident that the person
possesses experiential or documentary information about what they at least believe to be the true
identities of their associates. See. e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S.
539,540-42 (1963); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451-54. This is not necessarily true in the virtual world,
where individuals can, and do, associate with a high level of anonymity. These anonymous
associations pose a practical barrier to attempts to obtain information about associates. If, for
example, law enforcement officials identified someone and directed them to reveal the names of
those with whom they had associated with on-line, they could explain that this was impossible
because the associations were anonymous. In this scenario, the right to remain anonymous in effect
protects the right to maintain the confidentiality of one's associations. See generally People v.
Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001) (statute did not prohibit wearing masks "for
anonymity as a necessary corollary to freedom of association, both protected by the First
Amendment"). And if the on-line association were not conducted anonymously, then they could
simply invoke the right to maintain the confidentiality of those associations; the fact that the
association occurred in the virtual world instead of in the real world would be irrelevant.
47. "[Alnonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes." Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60,65 (1960). See Post, supra note 43, at 139 ("By permitting individuals
to communicate without fear of... retribution, anonymity permits information to be injected into
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real world conduct into the on-line context, where greater degrees of
anonymity are possible and where anonymity can more easily be exploited
to illicit ends.
As Professor David Post points out, it is necessary to devise new
approaches for dealing with anonymity in cyberspace "because there is not
really any existing law regarding truly anonymous communications or
transactions, for the simple reason that such communications or
transactions are, by definition ...

beyond the reach of ordinary legal

processes.' ' He uses the facts in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,49 a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on anonymous
communications,"° to illustrate why this is so. Mrs. McIntyre distributed
leaflets opposing a proposed tax levy; since some of the leaflets did not
identify her as the author, the Ohio Elections Commission fined her for
violating an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute
violated Mrs. McIntyre's First Amendment right to anonymous speech. 2
Of course, the acts that caused Mrs. Mcintyre to be fined
public discourse that might otherwise remain undisclosed"). See also Surveillance by Design,
Scientific American (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=
000B322D-294E-IC6F-84A909EC588ER21&pageNumber= 1 &catlD=2 (last visited Oct. 28, 2002)
("critical for ... whistle-blowers, political activists, those pursuing alternative lifestyles, and
entrepreneurs who want to acquire technical information without tipping off their competitors");
Hearings on "Mayhem Manuals and the Internet." supra note 45 (lets whistle-blowers "come
forward without fear of retribution" and lets individuals communicate "without sacrificing
personal privacy - for example a group of rape victims might wish to communicate with each
other without being personally identified"). See, e.g., Anderson v. Hale, 2001 WL 503045, at *7
(N.D. !11.
2001) (noting the chilling effect that would result from breaching the Internet anonymity
of members of "one of the most despicable and hated organizations of this time"). For an analysis
of legal and social conventions governing anonymity, see Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2192-95 (1996). But see LESSio, supra note 14, at 80:
Just as anonymity might give you the strength to state an unpopular view, it can
also shield you if you post an irresponsible view. Or a slanderous view. Or a
hurtful view.... Both utterances benefit from anonymity, but the community has
good reason to resist utterances like the second.
48. Post, supra note 43, at 141.
49. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 34142.
50. The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village
ofStratton, 122 S.Ct. 2080 (2002), in which it reiterated the importance of anonymous speech. See
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. Of Stratton, 122 S.Ct. 2080, 2089-90 (2001).
St. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337-38.
52. See id. at 357.

20021

THE PRIVACY PRIVILEGE: LAWENFORCEMENT. TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONS'TION

141

were not anonymous at all - she went to a meeting of her
neighbors and, acting in a manner such that her identity was evident
to all, distributed... literature without printed identification. There

were... two elements to the offense with which Mrs. McIntyre was
charged: (1) anonymous communication . . . and (2) some

nonanonymous action sufficient to allow her to be identified and
charged with the offense. Both were required.., but only with
respect to the first did the Ohio legislature make a choice; the
second is a consequence of a more fundamental requirement that
rules can only be enforced by identifying some party against whom
to proceed."
The Ohio statute at issue in McIntyre, like all criminal statutes, assumes

that perfect anonymity 4 cannot be achieved and that the lack of perfect
anonymity "can be counted on to resolve the enforcement dilemma."55
Inherent in our legal system is the correlative assumption that society can
and should allow a level of anonymity for its constructive benefits. The
reasoning behind this assumption is that if the right to speak anonymously
is abused for criminal or other undesirable purposes - descending into
"destructive anonymity" - it is likely that the perpetrator can be identified
and sanctioned for that conduct.5' Anonymity as a component of the right
53. Post, supra note 43, at 143.
54. "Perfect anonymity is the absence of information related to the source of an action."
Helms, supra note 10, at 301. Computer security expert Donn Parker describes what must be the
ultimate in perfect anonymity.
[An automated crime is a complete, fully automated, ready-to-use crime...
packaged in a single computer program.... When the program is executed, it
automatically commits the crime and removes any damning evidence...
Theoretically, anyone could ...send... an automated crime program over the

Internet for execution in the victims' computers. Because the crime can be
designed for bi-directional, perfect anonymity, the perpetrator need not know who
the victim was, what crime occurred, what method was used or even the results of
the crime. The victim, likewise, would not know the perpetrator, what method was
used, and where his or her losses went....
Donn Parker, Automated Crime, INFORMATION SECURITY (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.
infosecuritymag.com/articles/l999/autocrime.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
55. Helms, supra note 10, at 301.
56. These assumptions represent a pragmatic way of dealing with the issues Professor Lessig
raises, e.g., that while society may want to indulge constructive anonymity, it has good reason to
resist destructive anonymity. As long as these assumptions hold, society can tolerate anonymity
without finding the bargain too costly.

UNI)EIFSI7T OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

(Vol. 7

to be let alone therefore comes with minimal costs. As long as these
assumptions hold, constitutionally guaranteed anonymity does not pose a
significant problem for law enforcement. Like Mrs. McIntyre who
distributed leaflets anonymously, those who send death threats, distribute
child pornography and steal intellectual property are likely to be identified
by their actions in the real world, apprehended and punished.
Unfortunately, these assumptions do not hold in cyberspace, where
perfect anonymity is achieved because of the complex types of mediated
communication it allows. Any type of mediated communication, including
snail mail correspondence and telephone calls, holds the potential for some
level of anonymity since mediated communication by definition eliminates
the opportunity for the personal observation that is inevitable in face-toface interaction. In other words, cyberspace eliminates the ability to
observe someone like Mrs. McIntyre distribute leaflets of information. But
because snail mail correspondence and telephone calls only allow one-toone communication, it is difficult, if not impossible, to communicate
anonymously on a large scale." Had Mrs. McIntyre wanted to distribute
her leaflets anonymously, she would either have had to mail them to
individual voters in unmarked envelopes or take advantage of the
economies offered by bulk mail rates. Either option raises her risk of
compromising anonymity: if she took the first, she might well be observed
mailing the large quantity of leaflets in their envelopes; and if she took the
second, she would have to interact with post office employees to arrange
for bulk mailing."S
Maintaining anonymity would be even more difficult if she chose to
communicate her message by telephone. Mrs. McIntyre would have to call
each voter individually, and one or more might identify her voice. Using

57. See, e.g., Katyal, supranote 44, at 1048 ("[I]n realspace, pay telephones, cell phones, and
regular mail offer users some degree of anonymity, but these methods provide mostly point-to-point
communications between sender and recipient. On the intemet, however, one person can reach
millions with a single message"). See also WILSON, supra note 22, at 60 ("Making it possible for
one subscriber to talk to many others would have enhanced the telephone as a non-hierarchical
means of communication" but "li]t was not to be").
58. There are snail mail remailing services. See, e.g., What's Interesting? Letter Postcard
Remailing Service, available athttp://www.whatsinteresting.com/remail.htm (last visited Aug. 30,
2002). For a fee, payable in cash, by check, or by credit card, these services will mail envelopes,
postcards, or packages sent to them. See id. Payment by check or credit card obviously enhances
the likelihood that the person using the service can be identified, but this is a possibility even for
those who pay in cash, since the service tracks the ZIP codes of the items it sends. See What's
Interesting? Tracking, available at http'J/www.whatsinteresting.com/tracking.htm (last visited Aug.
30, 2002).
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a telephone on which caller identification had been disabled would prevent
those she called from identifying the source of the call, but the telephone
company would have records of the calls. These records could be used to
identify the telephone she used and, perhaps, to identify Mrs. McIntyre
herself. In none of these scenarios can Mrs. McIntyre achieve "threshold
anonymity," 9 let alone perfect anonymity.
Cyberspace eliminates these risks and gives Mrs. McIntyre the ability
to contact hundreds or even thousands of people with perfect anonymity:
[A] criminal using tools and other information easily available over
the Internet can operate in almost perfect anonymity. By weaving
his or her communications through a series of anonymous remailers;
by creating a few forged e-mail headers with powerful, point-andclick tools readily downloadable from many hacker web sites; or by
using a "free-trial" account or two, a hacker, online pornographer,

59. "Threshold anonymity" is the level of anonymity that "occurs when a person's actions
cannot be observed, attributed or discovered." Helms, supra note 10, at 301. Unlike perfect
anonymity, threshold anonymity cannot be equated to a complete absence of information about the
source of a communication:
Imagine a person receiving an "anonymous" letter in the mail. Even if the letter
is unsigned, the content and form tell the recipient something about the
author.... [I]f the letter is typed the originator had access to a typewriter or
printer. If the letter uses English words, the originator speaks English... If the
letter has a U.S. postmark, it likely originated from this country. If the letter has
the recipient's correct address and the contents have some relationship to his life,
the originator obviously knows the recipient in some way. These aspects... give
the recipient information about the originator. Thus, .. . the letter is not perfectly
anonymous.
Id See also George F. duPont, The Criminalization of True Anonymity in Cyberspace, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 191, 196-97 (2000-2001). Professor Michael Froomkin suggested that
Mrs. McIntyre could achieve perfect, "untraceable anonymity" ifshe"drop[ped] an unsigned leaflet
with no fingerprints on Bob's doorstep in the dead of night." Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on
the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash and Distributed Databases,15 J.L.
& CoM. 395, 418 (1996). If Mrs. McIntyre did this, she would no doubt achieve threshold
anonymity, but she would not achieve perfect anonymity as long as there was any chance she could
be linked to the leaflet. Bob might, for example, know Mrs. McIntyre was the advocate of the
position set out in the leaflet, or he might know someone who worked at the Kinko's where she had
the leaflets printed.
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or web based fraud artist can often effectively hide the trail of his
or her communications.'
Cyberspace lets Mrs. McIntyre achieve a level of anonymity she cannot
hope to achieve in the real world."' This creates questions as to whether the
legal guarantee of anonymity, crafted in the context of real world conduct,
and the limitations on that conduct, should encompass cyberworld conduct
that is not subject to those limitations. Because technology alters the
contours of the empirical environment in which the right to remain
anonymous is exercised, it creates a tension between this aspect of the right
to be let alone and the needs of effective law enforcement. 2
How should this tension be resolved? One approach is to conclude that
cyberspace is in fact a different place, and thus is not necessarily
encompassed by the anonymity guarantees crafted for the real world.
Logically, this solution offers to benchmark anonymity at the same level
in the real world and the cyberworld. There are two problems with this
solution. The first goes to the factual predicate upon which it is premised,
e.g., the assumption that the real world and the cyberworld are empirically
distinct places. This assumption is, as explained in Section III below,
factually incorrect: Cyberspace is not a place. It is the accreted product of

60. Holder Testimony, supra note 44. See also Post, supra note 43, at 149:

[E]veryone in cyberspace is connected to everyone else through the magic of
interconnectivity protocols and can communicate instantaneously on a one-to-one,
one-to-many, many-to-one, or many-to-many basis with a constantly shifting..
. population.... In the space of an afternoon, I can join a dozen (or a hundred)
ongoing associations by subscribing to individual listservers or Usenet discussion
groups, form a dozen new such associations myself with a few lines of code
inserted in my Internet Service Provider's system, and set up a dozen aliases on
my provider's mail system through which I can communicate....
See also Helms, supra note 10, at 316-18 (describing privacy-enhancing technologies that can be
used to ensure anonymity in cyberspace). Cyberspace also eliminates the practical and legal
constraints that militate against anonymity in real world publishing. See. e.g.. April Mara Major,
Norm OriginandDevelopment in Cyberspace:Models ofCybernormEvolution, 78 WASH. U. L.Q.
59, 99 (2000).
61. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Readingthe Constitutionin Cyberspace.45 EMORY L.J. 869,

876-77 (1996): "[Alnonymity in cyberspace is not just different in degree from anonymity in real
space.... [Clyberspace... gives an individual a kind of power that doesn't exist in real space.
This is not just the ability to put on a mask; it is the ability to hide absolutely who one is."
62. "Perfect anonymity makes perfect crime possible." Lawrence Lessig, The Path of
Cyberlaw, 104 YALE LJ. 1743, 1750 (1995).
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complex varieties of mediated communication; that being the case, there
is no empirical basis for creating a lesser set of First Amendment
protections for activities that take place via these types of mediated
communication."3 The second problem is pragmatic; it would be
extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming for courts to determine
precisely what types of anonymity are comparable to those found in the
real world and what types are not. For example, it seems that using an
anonymous remailing system in cyberspace is comparable to using a postal
remailing system in the real world.
There are two other possible approaches to dealing with the superseding
level of anonymity one can achieve via cyberspace. One is to simply
accept the incremental level of anonymity as an aspect of the types of
mediated communication cyberspace makes possible. After all, for over a
century, the telephone has created opportunities for anonymity that exceed
those available in the real world. While caller identification may curtail
some of those opportunities, many still exist, and yet there has never been
any effort to outlaw this aspect of telephonic communication."
The final alternative is to treat the problem for what it really is the use
of anonymity for criminal purposes. While cyberspace concededly allows
one to assume a level of anonymity exceeding that found in the real world,
there are real world analogues for the uses of on-line anonymity that cause
63. See, e.g.. Doe v. 2TheMart.Com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
('The right to speak anonymously extends to speech via the Internet"). The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the notion of two First Amendment standards in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ("[Ojur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium").
64. States have outlawed the use of telephone anonymity for improper purposes, such as
harassment or obscene phone calls. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(4) (Michie 2001)
(misdemeanor to make anonymous phone calls with the intent to harass or annoy another person);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916(A) (West 2001) (unlawful to "disturb by repeated anonymous
telephone calls the peace, quiet or right of privacy of any person"). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1311 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 18-6710 (Michie 2002); MD. ANN. CODE, CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS § 555A; N.M. STAT. § 30-20-12(A); VT.STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 1027 (2001). The
telephone, of course, offers opportunities for both anonymous and pseudonymous communication.
For centuries, snail mail also created opportunities for anonymity that exceed those available
in the real world. But while some states outlawed the use of anonymous letters for improper
purposes, there has never been an effort to outlaw "postal anonymity." See. e.g., NEV. REV.STAT.
ANN. § 207.180(2) (Michie 2001) (misdemeanor to "write and send" "any anonymous letter...
charging any person with crime; or... containing vulgar or threatening language, obscene pictures,
or containing reflections upon his standing in society or in the community"); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1304 (West 2002) (misdemeanor to send anonymous letters designed to threaten or
intimidate another). See also ARIZ.REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3004 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
836.10 (West 2001).
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concern for law enforcement. What causes this concern is the use of online techniques by criminals that either allow disguise of their identities
(anonymity) or permit the assumption of false identities (pseudonymity).
In the real world, the law has addressed the use of pseudonyms and the use

of masks to conceal one's identity for criminal purposes. With regard to
pseudonyms, states outlaw using false identities for certain purposes, such
as: obtaining a credit card,"s obtaining a firearms license," practicing
medicine,67 or obstructing justice."8 Some, including California, make it a
crime to offer, display, or possess documents intended to conceal the true
identity of oneself.6 As for masks, some states make it a crime to wear

disguises to conceal the identity of oneself for unlawful purposes; 0 others
make the wearing of a mask or disguise an aggravating factor in the
commission of an offense. 7'
Masks are a good real world analogue for anonymity achieved via
cyberspace: Masks let someone conceal his or her identifying physical
information in the real world just as remailers and other techniques let
individuals conceal their identifying information in the cyberworld. The
First Amendment protects the wearing of masks whenever the masks
themselves have expressive content 2 or whenever "there is such a nexus
between anonymity and speech that a bar on the first is tantamount to a

65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-194(a) (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49-2 (2001).
66. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-17 (Michie 2002). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1376 (2002) (use of false name to obtain dangerous drugs).
67. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.298 (West 2002).
68. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2107(A) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.59
(West 2001).
69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 529a (Deering 2001).
70. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 185 (Deering 2001) (unlawful to wear "any mask, false
whiskers or any personal disguise" for the purpose of evading discovery, recognition or
identification in the commission of any public offense); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1239 (West
2002) (wearing "a hood, mask or other disguise during the commission of any felony.., is a class
E felony"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3312.03 (2002) (unlawful to wear "any mask, hood, or device
whereby any portion of the face is hidden, concealed, or covered" while "engaged in conduct
prohibited by civil or criminal law, with the intent of avoiding identification"). See also 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 241 (West 2002) (offense for "two or more persons [to] go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege" secured by the U.S. Constitution or laws of the United States).
71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 775.0845 (Harrison 2001) ("The felony or misdemeanor
degree of any criminal offense... shall be reclassified to the next higher degree as provided in this
section if, while committing the offense, the offender was wearing a hood, mask, or other device
that concealed his or her identity"). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-2(B) (Michie 2002).
72. See, e.g., Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1144-45 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
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prohibition on the second."" Courts have rejected First Amendment
challenges to statutes that prohibit the wearing of masks for the purpose of
committing crimes.7 4 One approach to on-line anonymity would therefore
73. Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (quoted in American Knights
of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, Ind., 50 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ind. 1999)). See, e.g., Stephen
J. Simoni, Note, "Who Goes There?" -Proposinga Model Anti-Mask Act, 61 FORDHAM L. REv.
241, 245-46 (1992):
Challenges to anti-mask laws ....

have alleged both the direct violation and

inhibition of First Amendment rights. First, they have alleged that masks
constitute a form of expressive conduct, stating that the visual effects of their
masks assist in conveying their messages. Consequently, anti-mask laws directly
violate First Amendment rights and must therefore satisfy the test provided in
United States v. O'Brien. Second, individuals have alleged that masks are
necessary for them to publicly speak and assemble, because the resulting
anonymity reduces the risk of physical, economic, and social reprisals they would
suffer if identified as holding the beliefs that they do. Because anti-mask laws thus
inhibit exercise of First Amendment rights, they are also subject to the test in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.

(footnotes omitted). Anti-mask laws that directly violate First Amendment rights must be unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; this is established if the law in question is concerned with the
prohibited conduct itself, not with its communicative content. See United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377, 381-82 (1968). A law that inhibits the exercise of First Amendment rights can be
upheld only if it furthers a compelling state interest and that interest cannot be protected by
methods that are more narrowly defined. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995).
74. See, e.g., Church of Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F. Supp. 2d 583,
590 (W.D. Pa. 2000). In American Civil Liberties Union ofGeorgia v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228

(N.D. Ga. 1997), the District Court permanently enjoined the enforcement of a Georgia statute that
made it a crime to "knowingly transmit any data through a computer network... for the purpose
of... exchanging data with an electronic mailbox ... or any other electronic information storage
bank or point of access to electronic information if such data uses any individual name ... to
falsely identify the person." Id. at 1230 (quoting GA. CODE § 16-9-93.1). It found that the statute
was a "presumptively invalid content-based restriction" because "the identity of the speaker is no
different from other components of (a] document's contents that the author is free to include or
exclude." Id. at 1232 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,340-42 (1995)).
The District Court also found that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest; the state of Georgia claimed the statute intended to prevent fraud, but the District Court
pointed out that
the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve that end and instead sweeps
innocent, protected speech within its scope. Specifically, by its plain language the
criminal prohibition applies regardless of whether a speaker has any intent to
deceive or whether deception actually occurs. Therefore, it could apply to a wide
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be to analogize it to the wearing of masks for the purpose of engaging in
illegal acts in the real world, and thus criminalize on-line anonymity when
it is used, or is intended to be used, for the purpose of engaging in illegal
acts." This could be done either directly, by adopting statutes that outlaw
the use of on-line anonymity for unlawful purposes, or indirectly, by
making the use of on-line anonymity during the commission of a crime an

range of transmissions which "falsely identify"the sender, but are not"fraudulent"
within the specific meaning of the criminal code.
Id. at 1232. This differentiates the Georgia statute from anti-mask statutes that have been upheld
against First Amendment challenges since the latter have explicitly tied the wearing of disguises
to the achievement of some unlawful purpose. See, e.g., Simoni, supra note 73, at 256 ("Anti-mask
that prohibit mask-wearing only when the wearer possesses specified criminal intent permit
virtually all First Amendment exercise by mask-wearers, requiring only that they possess no
criminal intent. By not burdening speech substantially more than is necessary, these laws satisfy
the narrowly tailored requirement") (footnote omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission is also distinguishable since (a) it involved political speech
which "occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment" and (b) Ohio's
articulated interest was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest it asserted. See
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346, 351-52.
75. To be workable, this approach requires that there be some way to identify those who have
used anonymity for illegal purposes, and this is complicated by the fact that cyberspace creates the
potential for perfect anonymity. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. If someone achieves
perfect anonymity, then it is more likely than not that he will never be apprehended; and if he
cannot be apprehended, he cannot be prosecuted for assuming anonymity for illegal purposes and
for the crimes he committed while anonymous.
One solution to this problem is to assign Internet Protocol (IP) addresses; the IP addresses
would be analogous to assigning Social Security or other identifying numbers, therefore not
involving First Amendment speech guarantees. Some might argue that assigned IP addresses
eliminate the possibility of remaining anonymous in cyberspace. How can you speak anonymously
if your IP address gives you away?
It should, however, be possible to assign IPaddresses and still allow for a level of on-line
anonymity that is analogous to the anonymity available in the real world. Assume, for example, that
someone in the real world wants to articulate their views on how the United States is treating Al
Qaeda detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In the real world, the caller phones the local talk radio
station and without giving a name, and perhaps even using a disguised voice, gives an opinion
anonymously. Comparable opportunities could be created on-line: services analogous to radio
stations could be created to permit the expression of opinions (talk-cyberspace). The services would
assign a unique identifier to visitors for each visit. The identifier would be valid within the service
and the visitor's IPaddress would not be available to the other users; the service would know each
visitor's IP address, just as radio stations can use caller identification technology to ascertain the
names and phone numbers of those who call into the stations. The effect would be to achieve a level
of anonymity on par with that currently available to those who patronize talk-radio.
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aggravating factor in sentencing offenders. 7 Either tactic has the virtue of
differentiating between licit on-line anonymity and illicit on-line
anonymity and allowing the government to seek the imposition of
sanctions against those who exploit on-line anonymity." Criminalizing the
use of on-line anonymity for unlawful purposes has the added virtue of
permitting prosecution of those who purposely make anonymity available
to individuals who use it for criminal purposes.7 ' The anonymity-providers
would be prosecuted as accomplices to the crimes their clients commit."

76. See. e.g.. United States v. Fellows, 157 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998) (U.S.S.G. §
2G2.4(b)(3), which provides a two-level enhancement if a defendant used a computer to acquire
child pornography. The statute "provides an extra deterrent to those inclined to pursue illicit
pictures in the anonymity of the computer world"). Fellows, 157 F.3d at 1202.
77. This approach preserves "the right to read anonymously." The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment guarantees a right to read anonymously because of "the likely
chilling effect that exposure of a reader's tastes would have on expressive conduct, broadly
understood - not only speech itself, but also the information-gathering activities that precede
speech." Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1010 (1996). Curtailing on-line anonymity,
even if it is only to limit it to the anonymity that is available off-line, would infringe this right by
denying individuals access to material that is only available on-line. This approach would allow
individuals anonymous access to legitimate material that is available on-line, while imposing
criminal liability on those who sought out illegitimate material such as child pornography. See. e.g.,
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-10 (1990) (state could outlaw possession and viewing of child
pornography).
78. See, e.g., 1999 Revision of the Model State Computer Crimes Code § 8.06, Commentary
("if it can be shown that the provider [of anonymous remailing services] had actual or constructive
knowledge of criminal activity being perpetrated through their system, then they could be held
criminally responsible as aiders and abettors"). See generally COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8105(a) (West 2001) ("A person is an accessory to crime if, with intent to hinder ... or prevent the
... prosecution... of another for the commission of a crime, he renders assistance to such person,"
including providing the person with a disguise). See also State v. Thompson, 754 So. 2d 412, 417
(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/02) (defendant aided and abetted commission of crime by, inter alia,
purchasing disguises used in committing it); Leigh v. State, 223 Ga. App. 726, 729 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996). In People v. Lauria,251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 479 (Cal. App. 2d 1967), the Lauria Court
concluded that "there is nothing in the furnishing of telephone answering service which would
necessarily imply assistance in ... illegal activities," e.g., prostitution, but an intent to participate
in the illegal activity can be inferred from "knowledge, when the volume of business with the buyer
is grossly disproportionate to any legitimate demand, or when sales for illegal use amount to a high
proportion of the seller's total business." Id.
As to pseudonyms, the law has made it an offense for a hotelkeeper knowingly to let someone
register under a false name. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Altenhaus, 57 N.E.2d 921, 922 (Mass.
1941) (reversing conviction under statute that made it a crime for an innkeeper to let someone
register using a false name). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-26-302(b) (Michie 2001).
79. Id
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This approach also alleviates the pragmatic objection to the first
approach discussed earlier, e.g., the difficulty of ascertaining which types
of anonymity are analogues to real world anonymity and which are not, so
that the latter can be prohibited. The target of this endeavor should not be
anonymity per se. Cyberspace should be encouraged to create new and
more elusive types of anonymity that can enhance free speech and freedom
of association. What cannot be tolerated is the use of anonymity for illegal
ends. Treating on-line anonymity as analogous to the wearing of masks in
the commission of criminal acts provides a clear standard for
differentiating improper uses of anonymity from proper uses. To achieve
a conviction under this approach, the prosecution would have to prove that
the defendant purposely assumed anonymity, or sought anonymity, for the
purpose of committing a crime.
III. FOURTH

AMENDMENT

Anonymity is not the only area in which tension arises between
individual rights and the needs of law enforcement. Cyberspace also raises
difficult questions about how law enforcement should be allowed to gather
evidence in cyberspace without violating the Fourth Amendment's
constitutional guarantee of privacy.
The Fourth Amendment historically protected the privacy of certain
physical spaces or areas from unauthorized law enforcement intrusion.'
When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the protection against
invasions of privacy lay in trespass law: "Ifsomeone entered your property
and rifled through your stuff,... [y]ou could sue that person for trespass,
whether he was a police officer or private citizen. The threat of such suits
gave the police an incentive not to invade your privacy."'" The Fourth
Amendment incorporated this common law notion of privacy and used the
concept of a search warrant to balance the citizen's interest in spatial
privacy against the state's need to gather evidence. 2 A warrant justified an
intrusion into an area that was constitutionally-deemed private, such as a
80. See supra text accompanying note 35.
8 1. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 112 (footnote omitted). See also LEsSIG, supra note 19.
82. See LESSIG, supranote 14, at 113 ("If the officer secured a warrant... before he made
his search, the warrant immunized him against trespass liability"). See, e.g., Humes v. Taber, 1850
R.1. LEXIS 26 (R.I. Sept. 1850) (warrant no defense to an action in trespass against a sheriff who
searched the wrong house); Jones v. Gibson, 1818 N.H. LEXIS 32 (N.H. Oct. 1818) (action in
trespass against an "inspector of revenue" for seizing goods without a warrant); Patcher v. Sprague,
2 Johns 462, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (valid warrant is a defense to an action for trespass).
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home. Areas that were not deemed private were outside the reach of the
Fourth Amendment'and
law enforcement was not obliged to obtain a
3
warrant to enter them.
As explained earlier, this common law-derived concept of privacy first
became problematic with the proliferation of telephone technology. In
Olmstead,the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal agents did not violate
the Fourth Amendment by using wiretaps to overhear conversations
conducted from inside a home, the ultimate Fourth Amendment sanctuary,
because they did not physically enter the home." In Katz, the Court
reversed its position in Olmsteadand held that wiretapping that permitted
officers to intercept conversations held in a phone booth was a search."5
Katz was understood to articulate a different approach to Fourth
Amendment privacy, one
in which the "core value.., was the protection
s6
of 'people, not places."j
In the framers' context of 1791, protecting against trespass to
property was an effective way to protect against trespass to privacy,
but in the Katz context of the 1960s it was not. In the 1960s much
of intimate life was conducted in places where property rules did
not reach (in the "ether," for example, of the AT&T telephone
network). And so a regime that made privacy hang on property did
not protect privacy to the same degree that the framers had intended.
Justice Stewart in Katz sought to remedy that by linking the [Fourth
Amendment to a more direct protection of privacy.
The link was the idea of a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." . . . Where people have a reasonable expectation of

privacy, the government cannot invade that space without satisfying
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 7
83. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,301-05 (1987). In Dunn, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that "open fields" are not encompassed by the privacy guarantee the Fourth Amendment
accords "persons, houses, papers and effects." See id. at 300-0 1. The Court found, as it had found
in earlier cases, that "open fields" are not protected as "private" because they do not harbor the
"intimate activity" that is associated with the sanctity ofthe home and the privacy of one's personal
life. See id.
84. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See also supra text accompanying
note 35.
85. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also supra text accompanying
note 40.
86. LESSIG,supra note 14, at 117 (footnote omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967)).
87. Id. at 117-18 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,

concurring)). Justice Harlan actually articulated the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard,
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But as this quote illustrates, it seems quite impossible to operationally
prohibit unreasonable searches without employing the concept of a place,
a space, or an area that is being searched. 8 For that reason, the old privacy
of place concept persisted even after Katz;89 indeed, it provides the basis
for the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United
States." Kyllo, which considered the use of thermal imaging technology by
police to detect heat escaping from a home,9 was expected to be the new
Katz, the decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court would explain how
Fourth Amendment guarantees apply to Twenty-First Century technology.
Many believe such a decision is necessary because of the impact
technology has on the Katz formulation of privacy. According to Katz, to
be within the protections of the Fourth Amendment, an area must be
encompassed by a reasonable expectation of privacy. As technology gives
rise to increasingly intrusive forms of surveillance, the reasonableness of
subjective expectations of privacy diminish, thereby reducing the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections.'

first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable." Thus a man's home is ...a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders
are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited.... [C]onversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J.,concurring). The majority's
formulation of the test was slightly different, e.g., "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." Id at 351 (citations omitted).
88. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (deciding what protection the Fourth Amendment
provides "[g]enerally.. . requires reference to a 'place"'). See also Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.
Ct. 2038, 2043 n. 1(2001) ("When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to 'search' meant
to look over or through for the purpose of finding something ...as, to search the house for a
book").
89. See. e.g.. Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 346, 352 (2001).
90. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046.

91. Id at 204041.
92. See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCnON OF PRIVACY IN
AMmERCA 61 (2000),
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Two strategies identified by Professor Lawrence Lessig that the U.S.
Supreme Court uses to interpret constitutional
standards are predicated on
93
presuppositions that have changed:
One strategy is focused on what the framers or founders would have
done - the strategy of one-step originalism.The second strategy
aims at finding a current reading of the original Constitution that
preserves its original meaning in the present context - a strategy
that I call translation."4
In Olmstead,Justice Brandeis unsuccessfully argued for translating Fourth
Amendment protections "into a context in which the technology for
invading privacy had changed." The Katz Court sought to accomplish this
translation, but many believe the test the Katz Court articulated has not
dealt well with the deployment of technology in the real world; and while
the Kyllo majority noted the problems with the Katz standard, the decision
seems to be a regression, a return to the privacy of place approach that
prevailed prior to Katz.96 Indeed, the Kyllo Court closed by quoting Carroll
v. United States,97 a pre-Olmstead decision, for the proposition that the
"Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted." '

93. See LESSIG, supra note 14, at 114.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 115; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
96. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
The Katz test... has often been criticized as... subjective and unpredictable.

While it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas such as telephone
booths, automobiles, or... uncovered portions of residences are at issue, in...
the search of the interior of homes.. . there is a ready criterion, with roots deep
in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is
acknowledged to be reasonable... [Olbtaining by sense-enhancing technology

any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,"
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512, 81 S.Ct. 679 constitutes a search... This assures
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted....
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (a pre-Katz decision that applied Olmstead's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment).
97. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
98. Kyllo, 121 S. CL at 2046 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
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So, where do things stand in terms of applying Fourth Amendment
protections to cyberspace? Given the persistence of the privacy of place
notion, the threshold issue must be whether or not cyberspace is a place in
which the protections of the Fourth Amendment can be, though need not
be, applied. There are two ways to approach this issue. The first is to
consider whether cyberspace is analogous to real world places.
One can certainly argue that cyberspace is analogous in many respects
to the real world." Like the real world, cyberspace contains stores,
government agencies, libraries, courts, universities, businesses, charities,
churches, forums, and art galleries."° Cyberspace even has its own mail
system. However, electrical signals construct these cyber-analogues of
terrestrial institutions. They are not made from brick, stone, or wood. As
a result, they tend to be more transparent, more permeable than their real
world counterparts.
E-mail is a good example of the evanescence of cyber-constructs. Email is far more vulnerable to interception than traditional snail mail.
Unlike snail mail, e-mail is not sealed (unless it is encrypted, a topic which
is addressed later), does not travel as a single, discrete whole, and travels
in a public domain where many types of information can be read by
anyone with a certain level of technical expertise.'' For this reason, it is
99. See, e.g., An Atlas ofCyberspaces: Mapping Cyberspace Using Geographic Metaphors,
available at http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/geographic.htmI (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
100. See, e.g., Edward Ayers, Cyberspace, US.A. in AMERICAN PLACES: ENCOUNTERS WITH
HISTORY (200 1), availableat http://www.oup-usa.org/sc/01 9513026X/0 I951 3026X_02.pdf (last
visited Aug. 13, 2002):

I write of a new American place .... "cyberspace." That place, simultaneously
metaphorical and tangible, has touched every part of the United States.
Information surges along networks ... weaving ever tighter webs across the
country and the world. Those networks define a space at once empty and densely
populated, desolate and hopeful....
At one level, cyberspace is merely bits of electronic information, zeroes and ones,
stored on computers and networks. At another level, it ismore concrete, addresses
and linkages whose names people know and can read. And at the sites where
people interact with one another, cyberspace becomes physical, filled with color,
sound, and image. Even though those places are merely projected on screens,
people have fallen in love there, have cooperated, conspired, traded, and raged.
101. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) ("Unlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally is not 'sealed' or secure, and can
be accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and recipient"). When an email message leaves the sender's computer, it is disassembled into packets of data, each of which
carries the addresses of the sender and the intended recipient. The packets are sent
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often compared to a post card, the contents of which can be read by anyone
who comes into contact with it as it travels from sender to recipient.'02
from server to server across the Internet. As each packet reaches a new server, it
is temporarily stored in that computer and then forwarded to another server until
the packet reaches its destination. .

.

. A router analyzes each packet of

information, determines the best available path, and passes the packet along to
another router that sends it toward its final destination....
[T]he message eventually reaches the destination server and is stored on that
computer. This destination server acts as a host for the receiver.... Here the
packets are reassembled and the original document is recreated.
Christopher C. Miller, Note, For Your Eyes Only? The Real Consequences ofUnencryptedE-Mail
in Attorney-Client Communication, 80 B.U. L. REV. 613, 618-19 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
Unencrypted packets can be intercepted in either of two ways.
First, the system administrator of a router can access and read any message sent
over its computer. Second, a cracker can use "sniffer" or "spoofer" software to
intercept packets.... A sniffer program intercepts all data traveling through the
server's network on the way to the destination computer.
[A] spoofer program "emulates the intended recipient's computer and receives any
mail intended for another machine." If a spoofer intercepts an entire message, it
can then "retain the message, forward it to the intended recipient, forward it to
others, or change the message."
Id. at 627 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lucy Schlauch Leonard, Comment, The High-Tech Legal
Practice:Attorney-Client Communications and the Internet, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 851, 858-59
(1998)).
102. See. e.g., "Privacy in the News," e-mail from Anonymizer (Jan. 9, 2002) (on file with
author):
Dear Anonymizer Customer,
Did you know that sending unprotected email is like sending a postcard ALMOST ANYONE between you and the recipient can read it!
For that reason, we recommend using a strong and versatile program like
ENSUREDMAIL to protect your sensitive electronic communications.
Ensuredmail is easy to use and works with most email software and services,
including Outlook, Outlook Express, Lotus, AOL, Hobnail, Yahoo Mail, and
many others.
See also "The Carnivore Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age,"
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Statement of Dr. Vinton G.Cerg, Sept. 6, 2000), availableat
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciay/oldsite/962000_vgc.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
E-mail is also unlike snail mail in that private entities transport it themselves and not the
government. This, however, should not be dispositive for Fourth Amendment purposes. Telephone
communication is also in the hands of private entities, and Katz held that it enjoys a Fourth
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Other types of communication found in cyberspace' 0 3 include listservs

and newsgroujps,' t
which provide asynchronous one-to-many
communication, l s instant messaging, which allows synchronous one-to-

one, one-to-many, many-to-many and/or many-to-one communication,10

and "bulletin boards, online forums or conferences."" Newsgroups,
bulletin boards and on-line forums are public discussion areas open to
anyone who wants to participate; participants read messages posted on-line
by others and can, if they wish, post responses. Listservs, which are
essentially e-mail distribution lists, can be public or private; private
listservs are closed to all but those who meet certain qualifications.' Like

a private listserv, instant messaging lets members of a defined group

Amendment expectation of privacy. The same is true of sealed letters or packages entrusted to

"private freight carriers" such as Federal Express. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.

109, 114 (1984).
103. Internet telephony is another means of communication, but since it is essentially a variant
on real world telephonic communication, it is not considered here. See, e.g., Jeanne Lee, Internet
Telephony, availableat http://www.cc.ubc.ca/ccandc/nov-dec96/iphone.htrnl (last visited Sept. 9,
2002) ("this technology allows point-to-point audio communication between two users in real time.
In other words, you can use your computer like a telephone").
104. See, e.g., E-Mail List General Information, available at http://www.uwex.edu/ces/wis
plan/helpdesk/emailllist/listgen.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002):
Lists make it easy for a group of people to have discussions via e-mail. Instead of
each of you having to send the mail message to each of the people who want to
have the discussion, you send the message to an e-mail address that identifies the
list. The message is then redistributed (called "exploded") to everyone who
subscribes to the list.
105. See, e.g. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 834-35. Listservs are primarily used
in either of two ways, e.g., "for one-to-many communication like newsletters or for many-to-many
communications where each member of a list can respond to the entire group." Nancy White, The
Tools of Online Connection (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.fullcirc.concommunity/
connecttools.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
106. See, e.g., NPTalk: Instant Messaging, available at http://www.ombwatch.org/article
articleview/322/I/96/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2002). See also White, supra note 105 ("Instant
messaging applications such as ICQ, MSN Instant Messenger and AOL's Instant Messenger allow
members of a group of users to see who is online at any moment, send instant messages and set up
spontaneous small chats").
107. White, supra note 105. See also Ron Mader, Mastering the Web: Online Forums
Bulletin Boards, Listservs, Usenet and Chats (2002), available at http://www.planeta.comleco
traveVperiod/master/online.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
108. See, e.g., Using Email Lists and More: The Power of Virtual Communities on the Net,
availableat http://www.ngflscotland.gov.uklconnectingcommunities/startingthlists.asp (last visited
Dec. 9, 2002).
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exchange messages. Instant messaging software can also be used for real
time chat." 9 On-line chat rooms allow people to enter cyberspace areas
where they can use text messages to interact with whomever else is there.
Most chat rooms are public because anyone who enters the chat room can
read the0 messages posted there, but many sites also offer private chat
rooms."|
These methods of communication are generally hosted by web sites.
Simply put, they can be found at a specific web site. Web sites are the
more or less stable areas built in cyberspace for the purpose of providing
information and/or conducting various activities. Some web sites are

extensions of real world endeavors, others are unique to cyberspace. Web
sites host chat rooms and virtual worlds such as MOOs and MUDs.'" They
are the locus of on-line businesses, art galleries, professional firms,
educational, charitable and religious institutions, libraries that offer text,
video and music resources, hobby sites that provide information about a
topic of interest to the creator of the site, and providers of news and
entertainment, etc."2 As with stores and other real world institutions, web
sites are private in that specific persons or entities own them, and they are

109. See, e.g., NPTalk, supra note 106.
110. See, e.g., Other Chat Areas on the Internet, available at http://www.chatmag.com/help/
others.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002); Local Free Adult Chat Rooms, available at http://www.
localfreeadultchatrooms.com/ (last visited Sept. 9,2002). See also Vanessa Hwang, Cable Modems
and Privacy in the New Millennium. 32 COLu .HUM. RTs. L. REv. 727, 767-68 (200 1)("For chat
rooms, the user first enters a 'lobby,' where s/he can then see other users participating in the
'conversation.' The user then has a choice: joining the current conversation, navigating to a 'public
roorn,' or entering a 'private room') (footnotes omitted).
11I.See, e.g., Ultima Online, availableat http://www.uo.com/ (last visited Sept. 9,2002). See
also An Atlas of Cyberspaces: Multi-User Dimensions (MUDS) & Virtual Worlds, available at
http://www.cybergeography.orgatlas/mudsvw.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
112. See, e.g.. Ayers, supra note 100:
Businesses quickly sprang up.. .; tens of millions of people "joined communities"

by posting Websites reflecting their personalities, interests, and images of
themselves. Those virtual communities soon became among the most heavily
visited places in cyberspace; twenty million people have created Web pages in one
virtual neighborhood or another, and the number of new arrivals continues to
expand.... At GeoCities, one of the largest virtual communities, visitors are
promised they can "meet people just like you." Websites are divided into
neighborhoods, blocks, and houses.
See also Jonathan Weber, Web PioneersLay Foundationfor Cyber-Communities,CNN.com (Sept.

II, 1997), availableat http://www. cnn.com/TEC/9709/1 I/net.community.lat/(last visited Sept.
9, 2002).
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public in that they invite some portion of the cyber-populace to visit the
web site to review its content and, often, to interact with its proprietors and

other site visitors. Web sites are also private in that they may have off-line
content which is not available to those who visit the public areas of the
web site. Some web sites are private in a different sense; they require
visitors to have a password to access the web site's content and to interact
with the proprietors and other authorized visitors." 3
As part of interacting with visitors, web sites, especially commercial
web sites, engage in "monitoring,"" 4 an activity that while analogous to
conduct found in the real world, is far more sophisticated. Monitoring is
not new; when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, and for centuries
before, "most people lived in communities that constantly monitored
everyone's behavior. Your comings and goings, who you were with, how

113. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2001),
withdrawn, 262 F.3d 972 (employee created password-protected web site where he posted material
critical of his employer). Such sites may, of course, be vulnerable to outsiders who possess the
skills necessary to crack the password protection and access the content they seek to preserve as
confidential. See, e.g., id.
at 1041 (official of company for which employee worked gained access
to his password-protected web site). Indeed, all web sites are vulnerable, in varying degrees, to the
efforts of those who would crack their security efforts in order to deface, alter or copy the
information they contain. This, however, is not a factor that militates against Fourth Amendment
protection: In the real world, law enforcement officers cannot enter someone's home without a
warrant even though it is unlocked and the front door is standing open; the home's status as
"private" for Fourth Amendment purposes derives from the societal understanding that it is
"reasonable" to expect that homes are immune from government intrusion absent a warrant, not
from the measures taken to make it difficult or impossible for such an intrusion to occur. See, e.g.,
People v. Camacho, 23 Cal. 4th 824, 835, (Cal. 2000) ("we cannot accept the proposition the
defendant forfeited the expectation his [home] would remain private simply because he did not
erect an impregnable barrier to access"). See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 402 (1974):
[A]nyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar,
cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining
absolutely quiet. This much withdrawal is not required ...to claim the benefit of
the Amendment because, if it were, the Amendment's benefit would be too stingy
to preserve the kind of open society to which we are committed and in which the
Amendment is supposed to function.
The same is true for businesses and other areas encompassed by Fourth Amendment protections.
See, e.g., In re Search of Lucky Spot, No. 90-404M, 1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14936, at *13-14
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 1990) (business had reasonable expectation of privacy in areas from which
general public was regularly excluded).
114. See LESSlO, supra note 14, at 150.
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much you spent at the market - all this was known by your neighbors. ' "
This type of monitoring still goes on in the real world, though the
urbanization of modem society has made it less intense. In cyberspace,
monitoring is more intense than ever. As one floats through the virtual
spaces of the cyberworld and interacts with web sites, automated systems
collect every bit of personal information entered by the user."' The way
this type of monitoring takes place in the public areas of cyberspace is
analogous to the observations of nosy neighbors in a small real world
community. However, the observations of those neighbors are certain to
be erratic, imperfect, and transient;" unlike the machine-made
observations in cyberspace, they cannot "be searched, or collected, or
produced as records."'1 8 In modem society the use of observational
technology is not limited to the cyberworld. While machine-made
observations in the cyberworld are concededly more detailed and intense,
they can be analogized to the use of real world monitoring technologies,
such as video cameras in public areas." 9

115. Id.
116. Id.at 153.
If you search on "mortgage" in a web search engine, advertising for mortgages
appears on your computer screen. The same for sex and for cars.... Data about
the search are collected...:
Data collection is the dominant activity of commercial web sites. Some 92
percent of them collect personal data from web users, which they then aggregate,
sort, and use.
Id
117. See id. at 150-51.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., NeighborhoodSpycam Helps Catch Murder Suspect, CNN.com (Feb. 9, 1999),
available at http://europe.cnn.comIUS/9902/09/big.brother/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2002):
Police surveillance cameras are aimed at public streets in at least a dozen U.S.
cities. And, by some estimates, another 200,000 video lookouts are in place in and
around private homes....
Video cameras record people in banks, convenience stores, casinos, offices, day
care centers, schools, buses and prisons. They monitor freeway traffic; they're
atop buildings as television news skycams.
See also Seth Stem, Security Trumps Privacy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 20,2001), available
at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1220/pl lsl-stct.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002) (noting
increased use of biometric scanners and facial-recognition cameras in public areas).
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Because of the way cyberspace is currently configured, it is not only
possible, but almost irresistible, to think of it as a virtual place, a contrived
mirror of the real world. It is true, of course, that much of what we
experience in the real world - streets, buildings, stores, vehicles, printed
materials, electronic devices, etc. - is also contrived, the product of
human intelligence and effort. In the real world, these contrivances must
necessarily operate within certain externally-dictated constraints. Pool
tables, for example, must have legs as well as tops. In the virtual world of
cyberspace, however, these constraints no longer hold true. Pool tables in
cyberspace do not require legs in this place where gravity does not exist.'2"
Logically, therefore, even if cyberspace is a conceptualized place, there is
no reason why that place should resemble the real world. The only reason
why cyberspace currently mirrors the components of the real world is
because those who originally settled the cyberspace frontier assumed that
this virtual place should operate according to the same constraints that
prevail in the real world. As cybercitizens grow more familiar with the
virtual world, this assumption will diminish in force, if not disappear
entirely, and cyberspace will come to resemble the real world less and less.
This will only make even harder the already difficult task of trying to
analogize the unsubstantial, transparent, permeable world of cyberspace to
the fixed, bounded real world.
The problem is that cyberspace is not a conventional physical place. A
person does not actually enter cyberspace, rather a person experiences
cyberspace. It is "a domain that exists along with but apart from the
physical world. It is a shared conceptual reality, a 'virtual world,' not a
shared physical reality." 2' It is a new space, one that has its origins in

120. See. e.g.. NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 50 (1992) (in the virtual world known as the
Metaverse, tables only have tops, not legs).
121.

Susan W. Brenner, IsThere Such a Thing as "Virtual Crime"?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1,

11 (200 1). See, e.g.. MARGARET WERTHEIM, THE PEARLY GATES OF CYBERSPACE: A HISTORY OF
SPACE FROM DANTE TO THE INTERNET 230-36 (1999).
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physical reality but transcends that reality. 22 Consequently, while one can
analogize cyberspace to real world places, the analogies are necessarily so
importing the
imperfect that it is inadvisable to use them as the basis for
23
cyberspace.
into
alone
let
be
to
right
Fourth Amendment
Where does all the imperfect analogies leave the importation of the
Fourth Amendment into cyberspace? One might, like the OlmsteadCourt,
declare that since cyberspace is an artificial construct, comprised of virtual
space rather than real space, the guarantees devised to protect us in the real
world do not apply to activities undertaken in the virtual world we choose
to visit. While this rcsolution has a certain straightforward simplicity, it
ignores the reality Katz recognized. The reality that privacy is a construct
which must transcend the methodological differences between the real
world as it existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted and the real
world as it is shaped by technology since technology is an essential aspect
of modern society. 124 The Katz Court based its holding on a recognition of
the role telephonic communication came to play in Twentieth Century
society.' Cyberspace already plays a far more integral role in TwentyFirst Century society than the telephone did when the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Katz, 26 and its importance will only increase. The information

122. See Brenner, supra notes 18 & 121; see also Richard A. Bartle, The Pearly Gates of
Cyberspace (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.mud.co.uk/richard/tpgoc.htm (last visited
Aug. 30, 2002) quoted in Brenner, supra note 18:
When I "go" into cyberspace I leave behind both Newton's and Einstein's laws.
...Traveling from Web site to Web site, my "motion" cannot be described by any
dynamical equations. The arena in which I find myself online cannot be quantified
by any physical metric; my journeys there cannot be measured by any physical
ruler. The very concept of "space" takes on here a new... meaning....
123. See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504,508 (W.D. Va. 1999), affid, 225
F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Cyberspace is a nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a computer
and telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis").
124. Even the Olmstead Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protected sealed mail
while it was in transit. See supra text accompanying note 26.
125. See supra text accompanying note 33. The decision also seems to have been prompted
by concerns about the increased sophistication and proliferation of surveillance technology after
World War 11. See Gormly, supra note 3, at 1362-67.
126. See, e.g., Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508 ("Legal scholars and Congress have noted the
ubiquity of cyberspace in the lives of all Americans.... The members of our society increasingly
live important parts of their lives through the Internet"). See also Hearing on "Fourth Amendment
and the Internet" Before The Subcommittee on the Constitution ofthe Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives (Opening Statement of Chairman Canady) (April 6, 2000),
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people previously kept in their homes, file cabinets, wallets, and purses is
migrating to cyberspace. 117 Many of the activities formally conducted in
the real world or through the telephone have also moved into cyberspace.
This trend will only accelerate.
There is another way to interpret the privacy of place notion. If one can
define the Fourth Amendment concept of place functionally - as the locus
of human activities - instead of corporeally - as a physicallycircumscribed area - then it becomes possible to extrapolate Fourth
Amendment privacy protections to cyberspace.
Is it reasonable to translate the values incorporated in the Fourth
Amendment into a context created and sustained by technology? This
transfer of Fourth Amendment values into a technology context is
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to parsing the Fourth
Amendment notion of privacy as place. The Fourth Amendment's origins
in trespass law notwithstanding, the Court has never equated place with
physical area. 2 ' Instead, the Court has looked to the nature of the activities
one expects to conduct in a given location. This approach is evident in the
Court's reverence for the home and the curtilage; 29 in its refusal to make
available at http:llcommdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju66503.000/hju66503_O.htm(last
visited Aug. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Canady Statement]:
[A] recent report by the White House working group... states that the... number
of Internet users in the U.S. is projected to reach 177 million by the end of 2003
and the number of Internet users worldwide is estimated to reach 502 million by
2003.
The Internet is not like the telephone system or the mail ... [lit combines a
much broader range of functions serving not only the one-on-one functions of the
telephone and the mail but also a wide variety of informational, artistic, political
and sales and marketing functions. The development of the Internet as a network
global communications medium, the expansion in the range of transactions that
occur on line and the amount of information now stored with third party Internet
companies . . . have produced a qualitative change in the nature of
communications ....
127. See Canady Statement, supra note 126.
128. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) (U.S. Supreme Court refused
to find that "the government's intrusion upon an open field" is a "search in the constitutional sense
because that intrusion is a trespass at common law," since the property rights "protected by the
common law of trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment").
129. Curtilage refers to the land surrounding a home that is used to host intimate, personal
activities. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) ("central component" of
Fourth Amendment "privacy of place" inquiry is "whether the area harbors the intimate activity
associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life') (quoting Boyd v. United

THE PRIVACY PRIVILEGE: LAW ENFORCEMENT. TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUTION

20021

163

Fourth Amendment protections coextensive with the acreage one
occupies; "°in its willingness to extend Fourth Amendment protections to
temporary homes occupied by overnight guests; 3 and in its willingness to
accord Fourth Amendment protection to employees' offices.'32 The theme
that runs through these decisions is that the Fourth Amendment protects an
individual's right to conduct certain activities privately, while secluded
from others. The place is simply a necessary incident of this right to
withdraw away from others as an aspect of the right to be let alone.
This approach shifts the focus of the Fourth Amendment from place to
activity. Activity encompasses communication, both non-mediated and
mediated. It does, for example, violate the Fourth Amendment for an
officer to enter the curtilage of a home in order to eavesdrop on
conversations that occur there. " Also, as explained earlier, the Fourth
Amendment protects the privacy of telephone conversations and of sealed
snail mail while it is in transit. Why is this important? It is important
because what we call cyberspace is not actual space at all. It is, as William
Gibson said, a "consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions....
A graphical representation of data abstracted from the banks" of computers
around the world.' 34 Cyberspace is not a thing; it is an activity,' 3 ' a
complex type of mediated communication, and as such, it is entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection. We cannot, however, parse the extent to
which this particular type of mediated communication is entitled to Fourth

States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886). See also Kyllo v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2038,2046(2001);
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
130. See. e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 ("open fields do not provide the setting for those
intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance"). See also supra text accompanying note 128.
131. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990) ("To hold that an overnight guest has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his host's home merely recognizes the everyday expectations
of privacy that we all share"). See also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
132. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987). See also Oliver, 466 U.S.
at 178 n.8; Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,311 (1978). While the Fourth Amendment was
no doubt intended to outlaw the use of general warrants to search businesses, it is unlikely that the
Framers would have contemplated protecting a government employee from searches conducted by
her employer.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938,941 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971). See also United
States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1032 (1969).

134.

WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER

51 (1984). Gibson, of course, coined the term

"cyberspace."
135. See, e.g.. Albert Benschop, Peculiarities of Cyberspace: Building Blocks for an Internet
Sociology, available at http://www.pscw.uva.nl/sociosite/websoc/indexE.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2002).
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Amendment protection until we complete one more analytical step,
namely, articulating how this approach fits into the structure of the Fourth
Amendment and, indeed, into the general contours of the right to be let
alone as derived from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
The Fourth Amendment contains two clauses, the Unreasonable
Searches Clause' 36 and the Warrant Clause. 37 Together, these clauses are
considered to create a right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, they actually function very differently and must
therefore be analyzed separately. The Warrant Clause creates a set of
procedural rights and thereby imposes certain obligations on the
government, such as ensuring that warrants are based on probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describe the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' 3' The Warrant Clause is
functionally analogous to other procedural guarantees, such as the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' 39 and the
procedural rights the Sixth Amendment confers on defendants in criminal
trials.' 4° That is, it puts the onus on the state, rather than the individual, to
carry out the requirements communicated in the amendment. Not only is
the individual not required to invoke these rights, but an individual must
take affirmative and unequivocal steps to surrender them.' 4' The Warrant
136. The Unreasonable Searches Clause reads "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137. The Warrant Clause states "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
138. Id.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
140. U.S. CONST. amend. VI,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,... and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
141. See, e.g., Hall v. Moore, 253 F.3d 624, 628 (11 th Cir. 2001).
[A]lthough a defendant may waive his Sixth Amendment right to... counsel ...
the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so... he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
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other constitutional procedural guarantees, imposes a duty on
Clause, like
142
the state.
The Unreasonable Searches Clause, on the other hand, functions as a
privilege, not as a right. 43 This clause does not specify obligations that are
imposed on the state. Instead, it articulates an exemption, an immunity,
from unreasonable searches. 44 In so doing, it gives rise to the notion of
privacy of place, which is the contribution of the Fourth Amendment to the
more general right to be let alone. The First Amendment contributes
anonymity and the Fifth Amendment contributes an exemption from being
required to testify against one's self. 45 Although the Fifth Amendment is
the only one of the three that is commonly adumbrated as a privilege, all
three, taken in isolation and as constituents of the right to be let alone,
function as privileges because they put the onus of invoking privacy on the
individual, not on the state. Unlike rights, privileges must be invoked to be
honored. 4 6 Once an individual invokes a privilege, the state is obligated to
honor it if the invocation is valid. It is reasonable to place the burden of
implementing the Warrant Clause requirements on the state because the
state controls the procedures involved in issuing and executing warrants.
It is equally reasonable to make the state responsible for providing counsel
and other procedural devices to defendants in criminal cases because the
state controls the adjudicative process. It would be unreasonable to make

the state the arbiter of privacy because the state does not have a vested
interest in privacy. Indeed, privacy is in many respects antithetical to the
state's interests since, if nothing else, the limitations imposed by privacy
make it more difficult to investigate and prosecute crimes.
open."... A defendant... must clearly and unequivocally assert his right to selfrepresentation. The court must conduct a hearing to ensure that the defendant is
fully aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel.
(quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
95 n.31 (1972) ("in the civil no less than inthe criminal arena" courts indulge "every reasonable
presumption" against the waiver of due process rights).
142: A "right" is something "due to a person by . . . legal guarantee." BLACK'S LAW

DIcTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). Rights create duties, so if there is "no duty there can be no right." Id.
143. A "privilege" is an exemption or immunity. See id. This is why the Katz Court said the
Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("the right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable
searchers... shall not be violated").
145. As to the First Amendment Guarantee of Anonymity, see supra note 10. For the Fifth
Amendment Guarantee, see U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("no person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself').
146. See, e.g.. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976).
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The definition of the privacy privilege in the Fourth Amendment must
therefore come from the people. Like evidentiary privileges, the U.S.
Supreme Court derived the contours of the privacy privilege by balancing
evolving societal expectations of privacy against the state's interest in
information-gathering. 4 7 Katz made this explicit and, in so doing, made it
clear that the privacy privilege can evolve to encompass4 new technologies,
specifically, new forms of mediated communication.1 '
The Katz Court also made it clear that in order to be effective, the
privacy privilege, like evidentiary privileges and the privilege against selfincrimination in the Fifth Amendment, must be invoked by the defendant.
As the Court said, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.... [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.', 49 Had Katz
conducted his conversation while the door to the phone booth was open,
so that the agents could overhear what he said without resorting to
wiretaps, his comments would not have been protected because he would
not have invoked the privilege. The same is true of someone who engages
in illegal activity in their own home while in full view of anyone outside;
the failure to draw curtains or otherwise invoke the privacy privilege

147. This is analogous to the process used to decide whether a new evidentiary privilege
should be created. The factors considered in that calculus are as follows:
(i) the importance to the community of the relationship sought to be protected; (2)
whether community values would be offended by governmental intrusion into the
privacy of the relationship; (3) the extent to which societal traditions... create a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality in such a relationship; (4) whether the
purpose of the relationship depends upon full and open communication; (5) the
extent to which such communication would be impeded by non-recognition of a
privilege; and (6) the. :.benefits to the public from... protecting the privacy of
the relationship in comparison to the cost to the litigation process resulting from
the loss of evidence.
2 C. MUELLER & L. KiRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 172 (2d ed. 1994).

148. It is important to note that, unlike evidentiary privileges, the Fourth Amendment's
"privacy privilege" does not put information permanently beyond the government's reach; it can
be overcome with a warrant. In this regard, the operation of this Fourth Amendment privilege is
analogous to the operation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, which
can be overcome with a grant of immunity.
149. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
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presumptively guaranteed by being present at home means that one is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment.'
There are therefore two aspects to the privacy privilege in the Fourth
Amendment: (a) the scope of the privilege, which is defined by the
expectations of society as to what level of privacy is reasonable at a given
historical moment; and (b) the invocation of the privilege by the
individual, which the government must respect unless it obtains a search
warrant. It is now necessary to consider how this privilege applies, if at all,

to cyberspace.
The first question is whether the privacy privilege applies to cyberspace
when cyberspace is construed as an activity, not as a place. As explained
earlier, cyberspace is properly analyzed as a perceived reality that emerges
from the interaction of multiple types of meditated communication."' The
privacy privilege clearly applies to mediated communication. In the
Nineteenth Century, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment privacy privilege protects sealed mail in transit, 2 and
subsequently the Twentieth Century Court expanded the privilege to
protect telephonic communication." 3 Given these precedents and the role
cyberspace has come to play in society, there is no doubt that the Court
will extend Fourth Amendment protection to cyberspace. The difficulty
lies not in the decision to extend this protection to cyberspace but in how
to define the protection. The types of mediated communication that have
been protected thus far both involve simple one-to-one communication.
The mediated communication that creates and sustains cyberspace involves
one-to-one communication, one-to-many communication, many-to-one
communication and many-to-many communication. Given the complexity
of the types of activities involved in cyberspace, the Court cannot simply
hold, as it did in Katz, that the Fourth Amendment protects this entire class
of computer-mediated communication. It would not, for instance, be
reasonable to hold that the Fourth Amendment categorically protects
messages posted to a newsgroup.
The requirement that the privilege must be invoked to be effective is
the solution to this problem. In extending this privilege to cyberspace, the

150. See, e.g., United States v. $61,433.04 U.S. Currency, 894 F. Supp. 906,910 (E.D.N.C.
1995), aff'd. 90 F.3d 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (not a violation of Fourth Amendment privacy for officers
to look through blinds in dining room window that were not completely closed).
151. See supratext accompanying notes 134-35.
152. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); see also supra note 26.
153. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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U.S. Supreme Court must stress that, unlike the home,'54 cyberspace is not
a context in which the Fourth Amendment presumptively applies. The
Court must make it clear that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
computer-mediated communications unless the parties to the communications affirmatively and effectively invoke the privacy privilege. One virtue
of this approach is that emphasizing invocation gives courts a standard
they can use when faced with the many varieties of computer-mediated
communication. Privacy cannot encompass communications unless the
parties took steps to ensure that they remained private, in effect, closing
the telephone booth door.'55 The parties might rely on encryption, on the
use of private, password-protected areas, or other security measures.
However, they would not be able to claim the protections of the Fourth
Amendment if they did nothing to preserve the privacy of the
communications at issue.
Returning to the newsgroup example above, a court would reject a
claim that someone had an expectation of privacy in messages posted to a
newsgroup on the grounds that there had been no invocation of the
privilege since the messages could be read by anyone who subscribed to
that newsgroup. If a person posted the messages to a listserv, a court would
have to determine if the listserv was open to the public or only accessible
to a defined group of subscribers. With the latter situation, a court would
then have to determine whether the subscribers had taken measures
sufficient to limit access to the listserv, thereby invoking the "privacy
privilege."' 5 6 The content posted on publicly-accessible areas of a web site
154. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001).
155. Cf Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, (5th Cir. 2001). The Kee Court held that police
did not violate a family's Fourth Amendment "privacy privilege" by putting a microphone in a
funeral urn and taping what they said at a funeral for two murdered children.
[M]ost damaging to Kee and Routier's argument is that they failed to present
evidence demonstrating any affirmative steps taken to preserve their privacy.
While it is apparent from their affidavits that they did not expect government
agents surreptitiously to be recording their prayers, they also were aware that the
service was being conducted in an outdoor setting. Kee and Routier fail to allege
that they took any steps to ensure that unwanted individuals were excluded or that
they did anything to preserve the private nature of the service. They point to no
reasonable safeguards or common-sense precautions taken to preserve their
expectation of privacy.
Id. at 216-17. The tapes came to light in the mother's trial for murdering the children. Id. at 208.
156. The "conversations" held on such a listserv can be analogized to the conversation at issue

in Katz. Although they are written, not oral, the discussions among the participants are in effect a
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would not be protected by the privilege. Content posted on controlledaccess areas might be protected, depending on the steps that were taken to
preserve its confidentiality. 5 7 The same would be true of messages posted
in "chat rooms..''. As to e-mails sent in the course of a one-to-one
correspondence, the use of encryption would clearly serve as an invocation
of the privilege, at least until the e-mails reached the intended recipient. 59
It is relatively easy to identify the broad measures that, if taken, can
qualify as an invocation of the privacy privilege. The difficult task is
determining whether particular measures, once taken, are sufficient to
constitute an invocation. Consider, for example, the use of encryption to
"conference call" involving multiple participants. As long as the participants have taken the steps
necessary to invoke the "privacy privilege," their discussions would be protected.
157. See. e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412,425 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2000):

ITihe creator of a web-site controls the site until ... it is posted on the Internet.
Once it is posted, . . . it may be accessed by anyone on the Internet. Without
protecting the web-site, the creator takes the risk of other individuals accessing it.
...ITlhe trial court was correct in its determination that Student maintained no
expectation of privacy in the web-site.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997):
[W]hen Defendant engaged in chat room conversations, he ran the risk of speaking
to an undercover agent.... Defendant could not have a reasonable expectation.of
privacy in the chat rooms. Accordingly, the e-mail sent by Defendant to others in
a "chat room" is not afforded any semblance of privacy; ... e-mail sent or
forwarded to the undercover agents is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Accord Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823,831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). See also United States
v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,418 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
159. Encryption would overcome the argument that e-mail, like a postcard, is not encompassed
by a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing
FourthAmendmentProtectionforlnternetCommunication, 10 HARV. L. REv. 1591, 1597(1997).
See also Smith v. State, 389 A.2d 858, 873 (Md. 1978) (Cole, J.,
dissenting), aff'r 442 U.S. 735
(1979) ("any writing on the outside of an envelope or a postcard can be easily read by postal
employees"). Some courts have found that there is "a limited reasonable expectation of privacy"
in e-mail while it is in transit. See, e.g., Charbonneau,979 F. Supp. at 1184; Maxwell, 45 M.J. at
418.
The fact that officers can use technology such as keystroke loggers to capture encryption keys
in no way undermines encryption's effectiveness as a way of invoking the "privacy privilege." See
infra note 164. In the real world, a reasonable expectation of privacy encompasses one's home
regardless of the measures taken to secure it. Even if the front door is standing unlocked and open,
law enforcement officers cannot cross the threshold without a warrant or an applicable exception
to the warrant requirement. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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shield e-mail. If e-mail correspondents do not employ encryption, they
cannot claim to have invoked the privacy privilege as they have done
nothing to preserve the confidentiality of their communications. But, if
they do employ encryption, what level of encryption will suffice to
constitute an invocation of the privilege? Must they use the strongest level
of encryption then available to invoke the privilege, or is it sufficient that
they use any level of encryption?
The reasonable approach is not to invite an arms race by requiring that
those who seek privacy employ the most recent, most sophisticated
technologies to invoke the privilege. Predicating invocation on the
sophistication of the countermeasures one employs is an unreasonable
approach. First, it ultimately pits individual privacy against government
technology, a battle the individual is destined to lose;"W and second, it is
inconsistent with the rationale behind the privilege. The Fourth
Amendment privacy privilege protects individuals from government
intrusions into activities that are not public, meaning that steps have been
taken to shield those activities from observation by members of the general
public.""' The privacy privilege puts law enforcement officers in the same
position as members of the general public. If one takes reasonable steps to

160. See, e.g., United States v. Elkins, 95 F. Supp. 2d 796,810 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) ("allowing
the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment to fall victim to a technological race between the
government and the people... is a race the people shall most certainly lose"). See also United
States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
161. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986):
The Fourth Amendment... has never... require[d] law enforcement officers to
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the
mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his
activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he
has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible....
The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez.. . took place within public
navigable airspace... ; from this point they were able to observe plants readily
discernible to the naked eye as marijuana... Any member of the public flying
in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
observed. On this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that
his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an
expectation that society is prepared to honor.
See also Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001) (police's use of technology "not in
general public use" to obtain information about the interior of a home violated a Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy).
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shield an activity from observation by members of the general public, that
activity is also protected from warrantless intrusions by law
enforcement.162
The effectiveness of an attempt to invoke the privacy privilege
therefore depends on whether the steps taken would reasonably shield
activity from observation by members of the general public, not on
whether or not the activity is shielded from observation by law
enforcement officers equipped with the latest intrusion technology. So, if
the utilization of fifty-six-bit encryption is an effective way to shield the
content of e-mails from the general public, including the members of the
general public who could otherwise review the e-mails as they travel from
sender to recipient(s), it is effective as an invocation of the privacy
privilege.
Emphasizing invocation also provides a way to deal with the type of
monitoring discussed earlier, the cyber-analogue of the observations by
nosy neighbors in the Eighteenth Century. Individuals who engage in
transactions that allow the gathering of personal data will not be able to
claim the benefits of the privacy privilege because they failed to invoke it.
This is true regardless of whether they act knowingly or negligently. By
entering cyberspace and engaging in transactions without taking measures
to establish privacy, they assume the risk that those transactions are not
private.
Another virtue of this approach is that placing the burden on the
individual to establish a cognizable privacy interest gives an individual's
control over the extent to which his or her activities are shielded by the
privacy privilege. This is consistent with Katz's risk-analysis, e.g., its
premise that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."' 63 Those who employ the
mediated communication ofcyberspace without taking steps to ensure their
privacy assume the risk that their communications will be read by
outsiders, including law enforcement officers. The effect will be to
encourage individuals to take steps to ensure the privacy of cyberspace
communications, and to develop technology that can be used to invoke the
privacy privilege.'" Indeed, since cyberspace is an artificial construct, it
162. See supra text accompanying note 158.
163. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
164. One can see this dynamic developing with regard to keystroke loggers. See, e.g.. Robert
Vamosi, We Know What You're Typing, MSNBC (Dec. 7,2001), availableat http://www.msnbc.
com/news/6690 I0.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2002) ("a keystroke logging program is a memory
application that records every keystroke a user makes on a given computer"). Since they record
keystrokes as they are typed, loggers can be used to capture text before it is encrypted or to capture
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should prove easier to do this than to counter surveillance technologies in
the real world. 6S
This approach provides a way to apply Fourth Amendment protections
to people engaged in computer-mediated communication. It is now
necessary to determine if the Fourth Amendment encompasses data that
contains the content of a communication or data that documents the
encryption keys. See. e.g., id Late in 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) confirmed
that it was developing "Magic Lantern," technology that would let the FBI plant a Trojan horse
keystroke logger on a target's computer by sending a computer virus via e-mail. See, e.g., FBI
Confirms "Magic Lantern" Exists, MSNBC (Dec. [2,2001), available at http://www.msnbc.comnews/671981 .asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2002). See also Vamosi, supra (a friend or relative of the
suspect could send the keystroke logger via e-mail). Earlier in 2001, the FBI used a keystroke
logger to obtain the encryption keys of Nicodemo Scarfo, a suspected mobster; the logger was
physically installed on the keyboard of Scarfo's computer during a surreptitious entry of his office.
See United States v. Scarfo, Order Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence, (D.N.J. - Crim. No.
00-404) (Dec. 26, 2001), available at http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/fed/html/crO0-404- .html (last
visited Oct 28, 2002). A search warrant authorized the entry and installation and the logger was
configured to "minimize" the information it obtained, e.g., to obtain only data pertaining to the
encryption key. See United States v. Scarfo, (D.N.J. - Crim. No. 00-404), Order Granting
Application for Surreptitious Entry and Installation, (May 8, 1999), available at http://www2.epic.
org/crypto/scarfo/orderS_99.pdf (last visited Dec..9, 2002). See also United States v. Scarfo,
(D.N.J. - Crim. No. 00-404), Affidavit of Randall S. Murch, (Oct. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.epic.org/crypto/scarfo/murch_aff.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2002). The use of the
"Magic Lantern" software to remotely install a keystroke logger would have to be authorized also,
initially by an attorney general, later by a court. See, e.g., Vamosi, supra. This is because the use
of a keystroke logger certainly constitutes a search, as it invades an activity in which the individual
has manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy; the acts of typing on the keyboard on which
the logger is installed typically occur in the individual's home or office, both places presumptively

encompassed by the Fourth Amendment's "privacy privilege." (The act of copying the key qualifies
as a "seizure" of the information it contains. See. e.g.. United States v. Scarfo, Order Denying
Motion, supra). The use of a warrant, or an alternative authorization approved by federal
legislation, makes the installation of the logger "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, so the
"privacy privilege" is not violated.
What is interesting, however, is that technology is developing in ways which lets individuals

detect whether a keystroke logger has been installed on their computer(s); and if a logger has been
installed, the software lets them disable it. See, e.g., David Coursey, Keep Yourself Top Secretl
How to Defeat Spyware (Part 2) (Jan. 4, 2002), available at http://www.zdnet.com/
anchordesk.stories/story/0, 10738,2836055,00.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2002). See also SpyCop,
available at http://www.spycop.com/ (last visited Aug. 30,2002). This dynamic illustrates how the

"privacy privilege" may evolve in cyberspace; as law enforcement devises techniques to penetrate
privacy, individuals respond with technology designed to make their privacy less impenetrable, a
process analogous to building fences and taking other tangible measures to establish the privacy
of an individual in the real world.
165. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 14, at 160 (as to cyberspace, one can "imagine an

architecture.

. . that

protects privacy rights in a way that real space cannot").
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transmission of a communication. In analyzing these issues, it is helpful to
compare the older forms of mediated communication, telephonic
communication and written correspondence, to computer-mediated
communication.
As to content,166 telephone conversations, like conversations in the real
world, are ephemeral. Unless a party to the conversation (or the
government acting pursuant to a wiretap authorization) records what is

said, the content dissipates except for what is left in the memories of the
parties. The Fourth Amendment protects the sanctity of the conversation
from intrusion by outsiders while it is in progress, but provides no recourse
for the perfidy of a party to the conversation who tapes it and turns the tape
over to the authorities or recounts the substance of the conversation to

them. 167 Written correspondence sent by snail mail or private carrier in the
real world does exist independently in a permanent, tangible form, and if
a letter is sealed, it remains private until it reaches the intended recipient.
Once it arrives, the Fourth Amendment, again, provides no6 recourse if the
recipient decides to turn the letter over to the authorities.1 1
Communication in cyberspace differs from these older types of
mediated communication in one important respect: There is no guarantee
that the content of the communication will be transferred exclusively to the
intended recipient(s). When someone receives an e-mail, it is read on the
mail server or downloaded to the recipient's computer. Either way, a copy
of the e-mail may remain on the server where it can be read by the network
administrator or members of the staff.'69 Assume that a network
166. For a definition of "content," see infra note 182.
167. See. e.g.. Katz, 389 U.S. at 363 n.** (White, J., concurring):
When one man speaks to another he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so
doing, including the risk that the man to whom he speaks will make public what
he has heard. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against unreliable (or lawabiding) associates. .

.

. It is but a logical and reasonable extension of this

principle that a man take the risk that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears
for later verbatim repetitions, is instead recording it or transmitting it to another.
(citation omitted). See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (one assumes the
risk of being betrayed by an informer "whenever we speak").
168. See, e.g., United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1995); State v.
Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 229 (La. 1996).
169. See, e.g.. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633-34 (E.D. Pa.
2001); WARREN G. KRUSE If & JAY G. HEISER, COMPUTER FORENSICs: INCIDENT RESPONSE
ESSENTIALS 36-37 (2002); Illinois Institute of Technology - How to Use Email, available at
http://cns.iit.edu/howto/useineltoolstindex.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2002). See also Seth T. Ross,
Attack of the Email Snoops, available at http://www.securius.comNewletters/Attack-of the-
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administrator reads an e-mail, finds incriminating evidence, and takes it to
the authorities.' 70 How does this possibility fit into the Fourth Amendment?
Is it reasonable to analogize the network administrator to the recipient of
written correspondence or a party to a telephone conversation? 71 One can
argue that it is in fact not reasonable to draw this analogy because the email correspondents did not knowingly make the network administrator a
party to their communication. The telephone and written correspondence
decisions are based on the proposition that by intentionally making
someone privy to a communication, one assumes the risk that the person
will prove faithless and will share the content of the communication with
others.'
The better approach, the Occam's Razor approach,' is to require that
the privacy privilege be invoked to be effective. By failing to encrypt their
e-mail, the parties to a correspondence fail to invoke the privilege and
therefore cannot claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Their
conduct is analogous to that of two individuals who conduct a telephone
conversation on cell phones while each is located in a public place. Each
fails to invoke the privilege by not taking steps to prevent bystanders from
overhearing what is said.
The more difficult issue arises with regard to third-party records that
document the transmission ofcomputer-mediated communications. Again,
it is helpful to begin by considering telephonic communication and
terrestrial mail correspondence. In Smith v. Maryland,'74 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police

Email Snoops.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002); Jim Gerland & Mark Winer, Internet Privacy and
Security, available at http://www.intemet-guys.com/display-article.php?articl=31 (last visited Oct.
28, 2002).
170. See, e.g.. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("there is the risk
that an employee or other person with direct access to the network service will access the e-mail").
171. The rule governing telephone conversations and written correspondence would apply to
e-mail correspondence. See, e.g., Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417-18 (like the party to a telephone
conversation, an e-mail correspondent assumes the risk that another correspondent will share the
communication with outsiders, including the authorities).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
173. Occam's Razor is a principle of logic attributed to medieval philosopher William of
Occam. See. e.g., Occam's Razor, Principia Cybernetica Web, available at http://pespmcl.vub.ac.
be/OCCAMRAZ.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2002). The principle is, basically, that the simplest
explanation is the best. See id. ("the principle states that one should not make more assumptions
than the minimum needed" to arrive at an explanation).
174. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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to use a pen register'" to record the numbers dialed on a telephone.'1 6 The
pen register, which records only the numbers dialed, not the content of the
calls, was installed by the telephone company at the police's request. They
did not have a warrant authorizing the installation.'" Smith argued that
capturing the numbers was a search under the Fourth Amendment, but the
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed:
Petitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here.
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and "exposed" that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In
so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal
to police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that
processed those numbers is merely the modem counterpart of the
operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the
subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls
through an operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of
privacy. .

.

. We are not inclined to hold that a different

constitutional result is required because the telephone company has
decided to automate.' 7'
With regard to mail covers, which are the "process by which a
nonconsensual record is made of any data appearing on the outside cover
of any sealed or unsealed class of mail matter," lower courts reached the
same conclusion." 9 The U.S. Supreme Court held that inspecting the
outside of mail in transit does not "disturb any privacy interest,"' and
several circuits have held that the use of a mail cover does not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the senders knowingly expose the outside of
the mail, including address information, to "postal employees and
others."'

175. A pen register is"a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released." Id at 736 n. 1.
A pen register does not intercept the content of an oral communication. See id.
176. See id. at 745-46.
177. See id. at 737.
178. See id at 744-45.
179. 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c).
180. United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2000).
181. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 177 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc). See also Vreeken
v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 14-15 (5th Cir.
1979).
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Should the same rule govern information collected by Internet Service
Providers, the channel by which one accesses cyberspace and sends email? In answering that question it is necessary to consider the two types
of non-content information generated by computer-mediated

communication: subscriber data and traffic data.' 2 Subscriber data is
information held by an Internet Service Provider that can be used to
establish "the type of the communication service used, the technical
provisions taken thereto and the period of service;" "the subscriber's
identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access number,
billing and payment information"; and "any other information ....
available on the basis of the service agreement". 3 Traffic data is
"computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer
system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of
communication, indicating the communication's origin, destination, route,
time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service."' " Of the two,
traffic data is the most analogous to the types of information elicited by
mail covers and by the pen register at issue in Smith. Like telephone
numbers and postal address information, traffic data is necessarily
exposed. " Most people probably do not understand the extent to which

182. See, e.g.. Council of Europe, Convention on Cyber Crime (ETS No. 185), Article I,
Article 21, & Explanatory Report 229, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadre
principal.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002) (content data is "the meaning or purport of the
communication, or the message or information being conveyed. ...It is everything transmitted as
part of the communication that is not traffic data"). Content data is addressed above. See supra text
accompanying notes 166.72.
183. Council of Europe, supra note 182, art. 18(3).
184. Id. art. l(d).
185. Some distinguish traffic data from telephone numbers or postal addresses, arguing that
traffic data can provide information about the nature of the communication itself. The size of a
message can, for example, provide clues as to whether it is purely textual or includes graphics See,
e.g., Manton M. Grier, Jr., The Software Formerly Known as "Carnivore": When Does E-Mail
Surveillance Encroach Upon A ReasonableExpectation ofPrivacy 52 S.C. L. REv. 875, 886-87
(2001):
[E-mail surveillance software once known as "Carnivore"] collect[s] the number
of bytes transferred in the message. The software represents a unit of data with an
"X" in the subject field. Thus, an e-mail sent containing seventeen bytes of data
is represented by eighteen Xs, while an e-mail containing twenty-nine bytes of
data is represented by thirty Xs. This data may seem insignificant, but consider the
following hypothetical: Ajudge authorizes FBI agents to use Carnivore to capture
e-mail addresses sent to and from a person suspected of violating child
pornography laws. While the agents are viewing this information, they notice most
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traffic data is exposed during the process of sending an e-mail. However,
their understanding of this exposure is no doubt equivalent to the
knowledge individuals have of the extent to which the telephone numbers
they call are exposed to the telephone company.1m Logically, therefore,
traffic data is encompassed by the rule enunciated in Smith, that is, there

can be no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in traffic data.
The same is true of subscriber data, but for slightly different reasons.
In UnitedStates v. Miller," the U.S. Supreme Court held that one does not
have a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in "information
voluntarily conveyed to... banks and exposed to their employees in the

ordinary course of business."'' The U.S. Supreme Court found that a
person "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government."'8 9 This
holding is analogous to the holding in Smith, but the cases are factually
distinguishable because of the extent to which the individual is aware that
he or she is providing personal information to the third party. The
information one reveals by making a telephone call, mailing a letter, or
sending an e-mail is incidental to the act of engaging in mediated

communication. The focus of the individual is on the communication itself,
not on the information that the act of communicating adventitiously
messages are small but some are extraordinarily large, perhaps indicating that
illegal pictures are being transmitted....
The size ofthe message, in other words, allows the agents to draw inferences about its content. This
type of information is also available, however, for telephone calls and items sent through the mail.
Telephone companies monitor the length of telephone calls for billing purposes; and postal workers
necessarily obtain some information about the weight of the letters and packages they transport. See
also, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, The Law Enforcement Implications ofNew

Technology 16 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/senatelcommittee/nca_ctte/law_
enforcement/lawenforcement.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) ("it is possible to build up quite a
detailed picture of a person from traffic data").
186.
187.
188.
189.

See supra text accompanying note 178.
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at442.
Id. at443.
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third

party will not be betrayed.
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reveals. This is not true when an individual actively shares personal
information with a third party. With subscriber data, the level of awareness
that one is exposing information and thereby assuming a risk that it will be
disclosed to the government is necessarily higher. In Miller, the information concerned financial transactions between Miller and two banks."9 For
subscriber data, the information includes not only pedigree information
such as one's name, address, and telephone number, but also financial
information and information about the account the subscriber has with the
Internet Service Provider. 9' Logically, therefore, subscriber data is
encompassed by the rule enunciated in Miller, and again, there is no Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy.
Is this result to traffic data and subscriber data consistent with the
premise advanced earlier, namely, that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches and should be construed as a privilege that must be
invoked to be effective? This premise necessarily includes a corollary,
namely, that one must be able to invoke the privilege. The discussion of
content data concluded that one can invoke the privilege as to the contents
of communications by encrypting those communications. If one chooses
not to employ encryption, one assumes the risk that the content of a
message will be read by an outsider who may share it with the authorities.
The ability to choose privacy or to run the risk of non-privacy gives the
individual the necessary element of choice. The element of choice is absent
with traffic data and subscriber data." If one wants to employ computermediated communication, one has no choice but to open an account with
an Internet Service Provider and give them the information they require.
Having done so, if the person wants to send e-mails, there is no choice as
to the quantum of routing and identifying information those e-mails will
reveal.
The Smith and Miller Courts found this acceptable, though in each
instance Congress subsequently enacted legislation creating additional
guarantees of privacy.' 93 Superseding legislation is always an option, but
the focus of this discussion is on the interpretation of constitutional
guarantees. Legislation is transient; the U.S. Constitution endures.
190. See id. at 437-38.
191. See Council of Europe, supra note 182.
192. As, indeed, it is for the other types of mediated communication, the telephone, and the
mail.
193. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848,

1868-73; Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, 92 Stat. 3641, 36973710.
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So, where does this leave the privacy of information held by a third
party? If the assumption is that establishing such information as private is
a desirable outcome, then there are several options that can be pursued.
Secrecy havens194 are a pragmatic solution. Secrecy havens are analogous
to the bank secrecy havens that emerged in the 1980s, in that each
' solution
guarantees the privacy of subscriber data. 95 This is an "outlaw" ' 96
that, aside from anything else, does not make it a desirable solution. 97
Another option is to create a subscriber-provider evidentiary privilege
that guarantees the privacy of subscriber data, and perhaps guarantees
some measure of traffic data.'98 The difficulty with this approach is that
while evidentiary privileges have been recognized as protecting
information given to third parties, each of these privileges protects a
relationship that society deems to be valuable for reasons beyond the
information. The attorney-client privilege, for example, protects the need
for full and free information sharing between an attorney and a client so
that the attorney can effectively represent the client. The same is true of the
doctor-patient privilege and the marital privilege in the way they both
guard the sanctity of communications in a personal relationship that
society deems significant enough to protect. As of now, there have been no
purely informational privileges, which is not to say that such privileges
cannot and should not be recognized. Perhaps they are a. necessary
concomitant of mediated communication as it is further extended by
advances in technology. One possible concern with recognizing such a

194. See infra text accompanying note 195.
195. See, e.g.. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, supra note 185 ("organised
crime figures could establish ISPs, with obvious potential adverse consequences for law
enforcement"). A secrecy haven would preserve the privacy of customer information and data
against "any legal action" by a state or a private litigant. See, e.g., About Haven Co., availableat
http://www.havenco.com/about-havenco/index.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2002).
196. "Outlaw" meaning "outside the law." See, e.g., 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 46 (4th ed. 1936) (in Anglo-Saxon practice, an "outlaw" was "outside the law, and
as a wild beast could be pursued and slain").
197. Subscriber data would be within the "outlaw" service provider's exclusive control, so
privacy could be assured for this level of information. Since a service provider must inevitably
interact with over service providers to transmit communications, it is difficult to see how an
"outlaw" service provider could guarantee the absolute anonymity of a client's e-mail
communications. At a minimum, the service provider's receiving and retransmitting of
communications should be able to identify the service provider from which the communication
came.
198. See, e.g., Model Code of Cybercrimes Investigative Procedure, art. XT § 3(a) &
Commentary to § 3 (recognizing Internet Service Provider-Client privilege), availableat http://
www.cybercrimes.net/MCCIP/artl I.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
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privilege is that like all evidentiary privileges, it effectively places the
information in question outside the scope of law enforcement efforts. This
is true in many cases despite the fact that the privileges incorporate
exceptions for communications made to further criminal activities.,
A third option is to expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment privacy
privilege so that it categorically encompasses a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information given to third-party record holders. Procedurally,
this approach would prove less of an impediment for law enforcement than
creating an evidentiary privilege, because unlike evidentiary privileges, the
privacy privilege can be overcome with a search warrant or an exception
to the warrant requirement. The critical question is a matter of policy, i.e.,
whether this option strikes a sufficiently reasonable balance between law
enforcement needs and individual privacy to justify such an expansion.
Ultimately, the answer must be that such an expansion simply cannot
be justified as protecting the interests that the privacy privilege was
intended to preserve. The Fourth Amendment does protect the privacy of
communicative processes among individuals, but only under certain
conditions; one of which is that the process involves known participants. 2'
"Known" does not mean that the participants have a particularly close
relationship with each other, nor does it imply the special type of
relationships that are the predicate for evidentiary privileges. "Known"
means that, at a minimum, the parties are acquainted and have some type
of personal or professional relationship. It is a barometer of the extent to
which society is willing to accept communications between these parties
as private. Society accepts that conversations between personal friends or
professional colleagues are private, if they have taken steps to invoke the
privacy privilege, such as speaking in a room with the door closed. Society
will not accept that a conversation between a cab driver and one who hires
the cab is private because there is no empirical foundation for the mutual
confidence that private implies; the cab driver and the customer interact as
fungible, anonymous types.
Therefore, the first problem with expanding the privacy privilege to
encompass traffic data and subscriber data is that there is no basis for
assuming privacy in interactions between the customers and employees of
an Internet Service Provider."° ' As to subscriber data, the customer knows
that there are employees who process the account, but the customer has no

199. See, e.g., id. art. Xi § 3(b).
200. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 185-91.
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idea who they are nor is there continuity of personnel that would establish
any kind of professional relationship. 2 2 Interchangeable employees will
handle the account at different times throughout its life.
This lack of known parties is even more apparent as to traffic data.
While the customer may have occasion to speak to one of the several
employees who have access to their account, the customer will never
interact with those who actually administer the account. Another problem,
at least as to traffic data, is that it is not the product of a communicative
process between the customers and employees of an Internet Service
Provider. Traffic data is the product of what is really a series of mechanical
processes, some involving the customer, such as addressing and sending
e-mails, while others involve the technology used to send and monitor the
course of e-mail.20 3 For all these reasons, it would not be reasonable to
expand the privacy privilege to encompass information given to third-party
record holders.
A fourth option is to use technology itself to invoke the privacy
privilege as to the content of subscriber data and traffic data. To the extent
possible, technology seems the most attractive alternative, since it
incorporates the notion of choice. 2 4 This solution leaves the decision of
whether to invoke privacy or to risk losing it in the hands of the individual.
Therefore, one can imagine a cyberspace in which it is possible to
participate on several levels of diminishing privacy. The first level would
offer channels that are highly secure for both personal data and traffic data,
the second would offer channels that provide some level of security as to
both, and the third level would offer channels that provide little security as
to either. One objection to this approach is that although it preserves the
choice option, it predicates the availability of choice upon the ability of an
individual or entity to pay for privacy; 20 the tier system would certainly
202. To use an example drawn from the real world, one who lives in a smaller community may
develop some familiarity with the postal employees who handle his mail, but it would be absurd
to contend that conversations between the postal customer and postal employees are "private."
203. Traffic data in this regard is analogous to the information detected by pen registers. See
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977) (a law enforcement official could not even
determine from the use of a pen register whether a communication existed).
204. The use of technology as the means of invoking the privilege leaves the decision whether
to do so or not in the hands of the individual. He or she can utilize technology to invoke the
privilege and thereby gain its protections; or an individual can do nothing to invoke the privilege
and thereby forfeit any claim to its protections.
205. See, e.g., Kenneth Troiano, Comment, Law Enforcement Use of High Technology: Does
Closing the Door Matter Anymore?, '24 CAL. W. L. REV. 83, 92 (1988) (claiming that only the
wealthy and criminals can afford the measures needed to counter surveillance technology); see, e.g..
Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature ofthe Fourth Amendment, 46
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cost more to subscribe to the channels with the highest security than to the
lower security channels. However, while that may seem an unfortunate
aspect of a tiered approach to privacy in cyberspace, it has always been a
component of Fourth Amendment privacy. One cannot enjoy the
fundamental level of Fourth Amendment privacy unless one is able to
create and sustain a home. As technology has become increasingly
pervasive, it has become impossible to invoke the privacy privilege in
many aspects of life without having the financial ability to take certain
countermeasures. 2' However debatable, the latter result may be, at least as
to the real world, that anyone who ventures into the cyberworld bears the
concomitant fiscal burden of ensuring privacy in that realm.
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination plays a very
modest role in protecting on-line privacy. Although the Nineteenth Century
U.S. Supreme Court found that the Fifth Amendment privilege played an
integral role in protecting "the privacies of life,"2 ' the modem Court has
reduced its role to bar the government from compelling someone to
provide testimony that is "incriminating.''2 °s
The Fifth Amendment privilege only comes into play when all three
elements are present, i.e., when someone is compelledto provide testimony
that is incriminating.2° Compulsion usually takes the form of a grand jury
subpoena enforceable by civil contempt sanctions.210 The compulsion must
seek to extort testimony, or oral or written communications from an
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 529, 541-42, 542 nn.94-95 (1978) (suggesting that privacy only exists for the
wealthy).
206. See, e.g., Ensure Privacy, availableat http://www.ensureprivacy.com (last visited Dec.
4, 2002) (purveyor of technological devices to prevent the use of wiretaps and other surveillance
technology). Another example involves cell phones: the content of conversations on analog cell
phones can easily be overheard by someone using a scanner; digital cell phone transmissions are
scrambled and therefore provide more protection. See, e.g., Cell Phone Security, Computing at
Cornell, availableat httpY/www.cit comell.odu/cellphonedsecurity.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2002).
207. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630(1886).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Braswell, 465 U.S. 605,611 n.8 (1984); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976). See also Andresen v. Maryland 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976). The three
requirements derive from the language the amendment uses to establish the privilege against selfincrimination, e.g., that "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself'. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
209. See, e.g.. Fisher,425 U.S. at 409.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1976).
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individual'2 ' because the Fifth Amendment privilege does not encompass
physical evidence per se.2 2 But the act of producing physical evidence
(i.e., documents, videotapes, etc.) in response to government compulsion
can itself be a testimonial act encompassed by the privilege. 23 To be
testimonial, the act of producing evidence must establish that the evidence
exists, that it is within the control of the person being compelled to produce
it, and that the evidence produced is evidence sought by the subpoena. 1 4
Finally, the third requirement is that the compelled testimony be
incriminating. 21 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the privilege "not
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction
under a... criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would
furnish a link 216
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for
"
crime.
a...
The requirement that all three elements be present accounts for the
limited role the Fifth Amendment plays in guaranteeing on-line privacy.
Actually, the primary obstacles are the first two elements, the requirements
27
that the government must seek to compel someone to provide testimony.
Because cyberspace is a perceived reality that emerges from
communicative activity,218 much of what comprises cyberspace qualifies
as testimony that could be encompassed by the Fifth Amendment

211. Corporations and other artificial entities are not protected by the Fifth amendment
privilege. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105-08 (1988).
212. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966) ("It is clear that the
protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take
...but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of'real or physical evidence'
does not violate it" (citations omitted)). See also,Fisher,425 U.S. at 408.
213. See Fisher,425 U.S. at 409.
214. See id at 409. See also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36-37 (2000).
215. See supra text accompanying note 213; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
216. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
217. See supra text accompanying note 213; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
218. See GIBSON, supra note 134, at 51; see Benschop, supra note 135.
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privilege.219 The problem is that this testimony was not compelled by the
government.
The Fifth Amendment provides no protection for communications that
are made voluntarily. All voluntary statements waive the privilege.220
Therefore, any comments that are posted on-line are outside the privilege

because the person responsible has voluntarily posted them, and thus is not
compelled to "testify.' 22 This is true regardless of whether the comments
are posted in public areas such as web sites or newsgroups, or in private
conversations in a chat room. Someone in a chat room chatting with an
undercover officer is under no compulsion to have that conversation;
indeed, one cannot be under any official compulsion because one is
unaware that one is speaking to an agent of the state.222 Therefore, as to the
content of communications posted on-line, compulsion is lacking.

219. Testimony is an act that, "must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion
or disclose information." See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). Most of the
constituent elements of cyberspace, e.g., web sites, postings to newsgroups, conversations in "chat
rooms," and e-mail clearly qualify as testimony under this definition because it involves making
factual assertions and disclosing information. The facts asserted or the information disclosed may
be false; however, testimony can be true or false. What is important in determining whether or not
a discrete component of cyberspace satisfies this test is whether it communicates something factual.
While much of what appears in cyberspace takes the form of textual communication, it is not the
only form in which information can be communicated and thereby qualify as testimony. For
example, it is possible to infer factual assertions from the graphical components of at least some
web sites. Unlike the physiological processes which the U.S. Supreme Court have found to yield
physical evidence instead of testimony, the intellectual process involved in designing the nontextual aspects of a web site can produce implicit testimonial communications. See, e.g.. United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 7 (1973) (suspect did not provide testimony by simply reading
transcript; the purpose was to obtain a sample that could be used to measure the physical properties
of his voice); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (requiring suspect to
provide samples of his handwriting by copying letters and symbols as directed did not elicit
testimony).
220. See. e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1976).
221. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the rule governing voluntary statements applies
to documents. By preparing a document, a person voluntarily gives the testimony it contains and
therefore cannot claim the privilege as to its contents. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 6101 I (1 984); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976). The U.S. Supreme Court
has indicated that diaries may be governed by a different rule. See id. at 401 n.7 ("Special problems
of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary... are not presented here")
(citing United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (2d Cir. 1969)).
222. See, e.g.. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966) (a Fifth Amendment
privilege is not implicated by the use of undercover agents before charges are filed because of the
lack of compulsion).
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The area in which the Fifth Amendment can come into play involves
the use of encryption.223 Section III of this Article explained that to invoke
the Fourth Amendment's privacy privilege for the content of on-line
communications such as e-mail, the correspondents must take steps to
ensure that the content cannot be read by anyone other than the sender and

the intended recipient. The solution is to use encryption:
codes that convert information into a secret form. Cryptography has
been used in one form or another since ancient times, but today, the
widespread use of computers has enabled cryptographic techniques
to become widely available and potentially very secure. Modem
computerized cryptography uses encryption algorithms to keep
digital information private, and the most complex of these
algorithms can encode data so thoroughly that it would take
millennia to decipher it with current technology."2 4
Encryption can also be used to protect data files stored in a computer or on
other storage media. 25 Assuming files are encrypted with an unbreakable
encryption algorithm,22 the only way that law enforcement can access the
content of those files is to use the password that can be used to decrypt the
files.227
However, what if the owner of the files refuses to give up the
password? If law enforcement officers ask for the password, the owner can
refuse to give it to them and will face no consequences unless a statutory
scheme requires the surrender ofencryption passwords has been enacted.228

223. See infra text accompanying note 212.
224. D. Forest Wolfe, Comment, The Government's Right to Read: MaintainingState Access
to DigitalData in the Age ofImpenetrable Encryption, 49 EMORY L.J. 711, 712 (2000) (footnotes
omitted). See, e.g.. Hushmail.com, available at https://www.hushmail.comnlPHPSESSID=
612acb585080cf64c I c6e007408ee8b (last visited Oct. 28, 2002); VME Explained, availableat
http://www.meganet.comTechnology/explain.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
225. See. e.g., Next-Generation Desktop/Laptop Data Security for the Enterprise, available
at http://www.meganet.com/Products/VME2000/VME2000.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
226. See, e.g., Christopher Wille, Unbreakable Encryption Using One Time Pads,
AspHeute.com (Sept. 24,2001), availableat http://www.aspheute.com/english/20010924.asp (last
visited Aug. 30, 2002).

227. See, e.g., Bert-Jaap Koops, What is Cryptography?,in CRYrTOANDSELF-INCRMINATION
FAQ (1999), availableat http://rechten.uvt.nl/koops/casi-faq.htm# 1.2 (last visited Dec: 18, 2002);
see also What is Public-Key Crytography?, availableat http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq/2-

I-l.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2002).
228. As Section III of this Article explained, officers can use a keystroke logger to seize the
encryption key, which implicates Fourth Amendment concerns.
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The viability of such a scheme is addressed below. On the other hand, if

a grand jury issues a subpoena to the owner directing him to produce the
password to the grand jury, this raises the possibility for invoking the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The subpoena establishes compulsion and it is reasonable to assume, if
only for the purposes of this analysis, that the contents of the encrypted
files will incriminate their owner.229 Therefore, the critical question is
whether or not the subpoena compels the production of incriminating
testimony. Answering this question requires considering two different
scenarios. In the first, the owner of the files committed the password to
memory and would have to appear before the grand jury and tell them what
the password is. In the second scenario, the owner of the files recorded the
password somewhere, in a diary, for example. In order to produce this
password for the grand jury the owner would have to give the grand jury
the entry in the diary.230
If the owner of the files committed the password to memory, then the
Fifth Amendment privilege also privileges the owner to refuse to recite it
before the grand jury as long as the contents of the files are incriminating.
Reciting the password to the grand jury constitutes a factual assertion: the
owner is being asked what password is needed to encrypt these files; if
answered, the response is a factual assertion in the form of the password
which establishes testimony.23 ' Although the password itself may not be
incriminating, it becomes a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the file owner if the contents of the files are incriminating. The
229. More precisely, it is reasonable to assume that the contents of the files will incriminate
their owner in some already completed criminal activity. Cf United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,
606-07 (1971) (Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be claimed to insulate one from liability for
criminal activity yet to be committed).
230. There can be a third scenario: The owner of the files can encrypt them and throw away
the encryption key but not before he "performfs] a mathematical operation on the encryption key
which produces a new [key] number. While this new number cannot be used directly to decrypt the
[files], the original key can be recovered using this new number." James D. Miller & Lixin Gao,
Creating a Subpoena-Proof Diary: A Technological Solution to a Legal Problem, 2001(3) J. INFO.
L. & TECk., available at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/O 1-3/miller.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
Since it will take some time to recover the original key, the files are effectively locked until that
can be done. See id The analysis presented in the text above encompasses this scenario, as well;
the only difference is that the focus would be on requiring the owner to produce the number that
can be used to recover the original encryption key, instead of on the original key itself.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27,43 (2000). See also United States v. Doe,
487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988). See generally United States v. Matos, 990 F. Supp. 141, 144
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (asking witness "How do you spell drawers?" and having him spell the word
would elicit testimony).
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government cannot access the contents of those files unless the file owner
identifies what the password is in testimony.232 But while the privilege
would protect someone from being compelled to recite a memorized
encryption password, the government could override the claim of the
privilege by granting the person immunity for the act of producing the
password.233
Now assume the password was recorded as a diary entry.234 The
password itself is not testimony, it is an artifact, not a communication. 2 "

The government has the files, but their content is inaccessible without the
password.236 However, if the owner delivers the password to the grand jury,
it can be used to produce the contents of the encrypted files. The issue
therefore is whether the owner's act of giving the entry containing the
password to the grand jury is a testimonial act of production encompassed
by the privilege against self-incrimination. 2" If the act of providing the
232. See supratext accompanying note 216.
233. See, e.g., Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 39-42.
234. For the purpose of this analysis, it is irrelevant whether the entry was made in a paper
diary or in a computer-generated diary. The type of record is not important; what is important is
that the key has been transformed from mere memory into a tangible record.
235. See. e.g.. Wolfe, supra note 224, at 737-38 (An encryption key can be a legitimate word
or sentence, but much more often it is a collection of unintelligible bits. Even if it were a sentence,
it is unlikely that a criminal would make it an incriminating sentence (such as "IMGUILTY"). But
see Greg S. Sergienko, SelfIncriminationand Crypto Keys, 2 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996) (key
could be given "incriminating, testimonial content by making it a word or phrase that confesses to
a crime" which carries little likelihood of prosecution "thereby triggering potential criminal liability
and therefore the protection of the Fifth Amendment" with little risk).
Presumably, even if the content of a key were construed as "testimony," that testimony would
not be protected by the Fifth Amendment because it would have been given voluntarily. See supra
text accompanying note 220. The only question that could arise in the scenario given above is
whether the fact the key was recorded in a diary matters. See supra text accompanying note 221.
236. The discussion above assumes the government already has the encrypted files because
if it does not, then the owner would also be required to physically produce the files to the grand
jury. The act of delivering the data files would be a testimonial act under the Fifth Amendment
unless the government already knew they existed and knew the owner had them. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that if these issues are a "foregone conclusion," i.e., are already within the
government's knowledge, then the act of producing evidence is not testimonial because it does not
"tell" the government anything. See. e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). If the
grand jury issued a subpoena that directed the owner to produce "any and all encrypted files that
may be in your possession," his producing such files would "tell" the government something it
apparently does not know; if, on the other hand, the subpoena directed the owner to produce
encrypted files that were described with great specificity, his producing them would not "tell" the
government anything it does not already know and would not, therefore, be testimonial.
237. If the government does not know that the owner has the key, then the act of handing over
the recorded entry would itself be a testimonial act of production within the scope of the privilege.
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password is testimony, the owner can claim the privilege because the
elements of compulsion and incrimination are present. If the act of
providing the password is not testimonial, the owner cannot claim the
privilege.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this particular
situation, it has indicated that the act of producing the key to a strongbox
containing incriminating documents is not testimony within the scope of
the Fifth Amendment privilege, but the act of reciting the combination to
a wall safe containing such documents is. 8 The distinction the Court
draws is whether the act in question requires an individual to express "the
contents of his own mind."239 Handing over a tangible key is a purely
physical act like the other acts the Court has found not to be testimonial."4
However, reciting a combination does require the person to use one's mind
to make a factual assertion, e.g., "the combination to the safe is .... ",24t
When the encryption password was recorded, it assumed tangible form and
became an artifact like the key to a strongbox. Since the password has an
independent, external existence, the owner of the files can give the
password to the grand jury without having to communicate the contents of
his own mind. Consequently, the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot apply
to this act.

The analysis thus far is based on scenarios in which a grand jury
subpoenas an encryption password. What role, if any, does the Fifth
Amendment play when law enforcement officers approach someone and
ask him or her to surrender an encryption password? Another question that
arises asks what role the Fifth Amendment plays when law enforcement
officers approach someone and ask him or her to surrender the encryption
password. If a password holder elects to comply, either by reciting a
memorized password or handing over a recorded password, it would be a
voluntary act outside the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The password holder can, on the other hand, decline to provide the
By giving the grand jury the key, the owner "tells" the state something it did not already know, e.g.,
that he has the key needed to encrypt the files. The scenario above, however, makes the logical
assumption on the facts given, i.e., that the government already knows the owner has the key and
is simply seeking possession of it. Under the "foregone conclusion" exception to the act of
production doctrine, merely producing what the government knows you have is not a testimonial
act. See supranote 224. See also Philip R. Reitinger, CompelledProductionof PlaintextandKeys,
1996 U. CHi LEoAL F. 171 (1996).
238. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43; United States v. Doe, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988).
239. See United States v. Doe, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9.
240. See supra text accompanying note 219.
241. See supra text accompanying note 231.

20021

TE PRIVACY PRIFILEGE: LAWENFORCEMENT.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE CON57TUOfN

19

password without consequence because officers currently cannot compel
someone to comply with the request.242 Could law enforcement be given
that ability? Could a statute be enacted that makes it a crime to refuse to
produce an encryption password to officers upon request? 243 Such a statute
could certainly be adopted, but its application would be unconstitutional

if the holder of a password could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege as
the basis for refusing to produce the password. The password holder would
be faced with the alternatives of giving up the password and thereby
providing incriminating testimony or refusing to give it up and being held
criminally liable for refusing.
This dilemma violates the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees the right
to refuse to provide incriminating "testimony." 2" Enforcing the statute
would, in other words, be unconstitutional (a) when the password holder
had memorized the password 4 and (b) when the government previously
did not know that this specific person was actually the possessor of a
password (in whatever form). 2' Enforcing the statute in these instances
would not, however, violate the Fifth Amendment if the statute gave the
password holder immunity for the act of producing the password.247 Even
absent a grant of immunity, enforcing the statute would not violate the
Fifth Amendment if the government knew that the person possessed a
password that had been reduced to tangible recorded form.
242. As Section III explained, the officers can bypass this step by using a keystroke logger to
"seize" the encryption key. Because this involves a "search" and "seizure," it implicates the Fourth
Amendment, notthe Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
243. See. e.g.. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part Ill - § 49 (Eng.) (judge can
impose "a disclosure requirement" for an encryption key), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/
acts/acts2000/00023-e.htm#49 (last visited Aug. 30, 2002). See also Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000, Part IIl - § 53(1) (Eng.) (offense to knowingly fail to provide encryption key
if directed to do so), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#53 (last
visited Aug. 30, 2002).
244. See. e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) ("the mandate of the great
privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate
effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers"). This dilemma is not a problem in
legal systems that do not have comparable protection against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Part IIl - §§ 34-37 (inferences from silence), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl994/UkpgaL19940033_enl.htin (last visited Dec.
18, 2002).
245. See supra text accompanying note 23 1.
246. See supra note 237.
247. Granting immunity for statutorily compelled disclosures has been found to satisfy the
Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4424(c)(1) (2002). See also ClifM v. Ind. Dep't of State
Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310,317 (Ind. 1995); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848,857
(Utah 1992).
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Instead of criminalizing the refusal to surrender encryption passwords,
which does raise Fifth Amendment issues, another option is to require
individuals to escrow their encryption passwords with the government or
some trusted third party."" Such a requirement would not violate the Fifth
Amendment because the escrowed password could not be used to produce
evidence that would incriminate the owner in crimes that were already
committed before the password was given to the escrow agent."4 The
owner could not invoke the Fifth Amendment for crimes committed after
the password was sent into escrow because the Fifth Amendment provides
20
no protection against incriminating oneself for crimes not yet committed.
V. THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING LET ALONE

The right to be let alone postulated by Justices Brandeis and Warren at
the end of the Nineteenth Century 2l' became the privilege of being let
alone in the Twenty-First Century. Unlike the right to be let alone, which
was conceived as a civil remedy for invasions perpetrated by the media and
other non-state actors, 2 the privilege of being let alone is of constitutional
import that concerns state action. It is designed to maintain a fair balance

248. See, e.g., H. Abelson et al., The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow and Trusted ThirdParty Encryption, Center for Democracy and Technology (Rev. 1998 version), available at
http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
249. Since the key must be escrowed before it is used, it cannot have been employed to
commit and/or to conceal the commission of past crimes. The key could, of course, be used to
encrypt subsequently generated evidence pertaining to the commission of past crimes, such as a
diary describing prior misdeeds. Assuming diaries are encompassed by the rule which dictates that
voluntarily created documents are not protected by the Fifth Amendment, the use of the key to
decrypt the diary would not violate the key owner's privilege against self-incrimination. See supra
text accompanying note 221. The contents of the diary are not protected because they represent
testimony that was given voluntarily; even if the key is considered "testimony," it is testimony
which the key owner voluntarily gave to the escrow agent; and the act of production doctrine does
not apply because law enforcement officers use a search warrant to obtain the key from the escrow
agent - the owner is not compelled to produce it. See, e.g.. David B. Walker, Privacy in the
DigitalAge: Encryption Policy- A Cal for CongressionalAction, 3 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 59-65
(1999).
250. As noted above, even if th contents of the key are assumed to be testimonial, the key was
created voluntarily and is not protected by the privilege; and since law enforcement obtains the key
from the escrow agent, under the authorization of a search warrant, the owner of the key is not
compelled to produce it.
251. See supra note 14.
252. See, e.g., Gormly, supra note 3, at 1343-52.
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between the interest of individuals in being free from official scrutiny and
the need of the government to collect evidence of criminal activity.
The privilege of being let alone is an amalgam of privacy protections
derived from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The protection
against self-incrimination from the Fifth Amendment is the only one of the
guarantees that has traditionally been characterized as a privilege, not as
a right. This characterization in no way diminishes the strength of the
protection provided by the Fifth Amendment. Instead, it accurately
captures the way the guarantee is operationalized. The Fifth Amendment
puts the obligation on the individual to invoke the protection against selfincrimination.2" Once invoked, the obligation shifts to the government,
who then honors the invocation. 254 This aspect of the Fifth Amendment
guarantee results because it functions in a manner analogous to evidentiary
privileges. Like those privileges, the Fifth Amendment protects testimony,
and also like them, it must be invoked to be effective. Requiring invocation
gives people a choice: to maintain the confidences protected by the
privilege or to waive the privilege and breach confidentiality.
This characterization has not traditionally been applied to the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches, which may not seem
to be at all analogous to testimonial privilege. As Section III demonstrates,
however, the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment are properly
cast as a privilege. The same is true of the guarantee of anonymity and
confidentiality from the First Amendment. Unlike a right, which puts the
onus of initiating the protection on the state, the protection of anonymity
and confidentiality from the First Amendment must be invoked before the
government will be required to take action to safeguard those interests.
One must, in other words, don a mask in the real world or take measures
to conceal one's identity in the cyberworld if one wishes to claim the
"privilege of anonymity" of the First Amendment. 2"
These three guarantees are all correctly characterized as privileges
because each protects privacy. The First Amendment protects the privacy
of the identity and associates of an individual; the Fourth Amendment
protects the privacy of the activities of an individual; and the Fifth
Amendment protects the privacy of the thoughts of an individual. The
degree to which they protect these different privacy interests has evolved
significantly since Justices Brandeis and Warren wrote in 1890. This
evolution is directly attributable to the increased sophistication and
253. See supranote 146 and accompanying text.
254. See id
255. See infra Section I!.
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proliferation of technology. This evolution is also responsible for the shift
from the Olmstead holding to the Katz holding. When the decision was
made by OlmsteadCourt, wiretaps were in their infancy and were therefore
an exceedingly uncommon event. By the time the decision was made by
the Katz Court, surveillance technology had become very sophisticated,
due in large part to advances made during World War II, ind the ability of
the government to spy on the activities of people had become a matter of
public concern. In changing the focus of the privacy protections of the
Fourth Amendment from places to people, the Katz Court sought to create
a more dynamic standard, one that could be used to address the increasing
invasiveness made possible by technology.
Prior to the development and proliferation of telephone technology,
which proved very problematic for the Olmstead Court, privacy was a
static concept solidly rooted in the real world. In that era, and for centuries
before, ensuring the privacy of the activities of oneself was a matter of
creating secure spaces - building walls and fences, closing and shuttering
windows and retreating into the enclosures one thereby created. Telephone
technology was the first mediated communication to transcend physical
space. With the telephone, people separated by miles can engage in direct,
synchronous communication. As the Olmstead Court failed to recognize,
the transcendence of this communication required the formulation of a new
approach to privacy, a dynamic approach that could evolve as technology
evolved. That was what the Katz Court sought to do. By holding that the
privacy guarantee in the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places,"256 the Katz Court took the first step toward recognizing the
privilege of being let alone.
In the years since the Katz decision, technology has developed beyond
the imagination of those who recognized that privacy must be defined by
what people do, not by where they do it. New forms of mediated
communication have emerged, creating the experiential world of

cyberspace. New types of real world surveillance technology has
developed, further threatening the privacy of life in the real world.
Recasting the First and Fourth Amendment guarantees as privileges and

then combining them with the Fifth Amendment to create a privilege of
being let alone is the way to achieve a comprehensive, dynamic standard
that can evolve as technology evolves.
Casting privacy guarantees as a privilege is appropriate because privacy
is intrinsically an oppositional concept. Privacy is, by its very nature, an

256. Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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antonym; it is prospective resistance to efforts to intrude where intrusion
would be unwelcome. It is also a social construct. As the Katz Court
recognized, the threshold level of privacy entitled to constitutional

protection is defined not by Congress or the courts, but rather by what
society is prepared to regard as reasonable. Although the Katz Court
articulated this in the context of the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment, it is also applicable to the protections provided by the First

and Fifth Amendments. As to the FirstAmendment, this is apparent in the
boundaries set on the uses of anonymity. Some uses are criminalized
because it would not be reasonable to let anonymity be exploited to
victimize others. 5 7 It is also apparent in the refusal of the U.S. Supreme
Court to extend the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to encompass statements voluntarily made to others, on the grounds that
it would be unreasonable. 258
The privilege to be let alone fashioned from these guarantees is an
empirically grounded device that will allow the constitutional protection
of individual privacy to evolve as technology evolves. It ensures the
dynamism the Katz Court sought by first, requiring that the privilege be
invoked to be effective and second, by using societal expectations to
determine when such invocation is effective. This effectively imports
contemporaneous technology into the interaction between individuals and
the state. Nothing in the U.S. Constitution prevents law enforcement
officers from monitoring the public areas of the real world and the
cyberworld. Indeed, it is their duty.259 If individuals want to maintain their
privacy, therefore, they must use whatever technologies are effective to
shield their identities, their activities, and their thoughts from the observant
eyes of the state.

257. See, e.g., Simoni, supra note 73, at 250 ("Few... would argue that preventing crime is

not an important or substantial government interest" justifying the criminalization of anonymity).
258. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,298 (1990) (Fifth Amendment does not protect
someone from boasting about his criminal activities to those he believes to be sympathetic); Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966).
259. "Police officers do not - indeed, the public would not want them to- close their eyes
to obvious crime-related information placed in front of them". United States v. Waletzki, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23697 (7th Cir. 1997).

